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Abstract 
Genetic Algorithms are the best known representation of a class of direct random search methods 
called evolutionary algorithms which are widely used to solve complex optimization and adaptation 
problems. They have grown in popularity within economics due to their ability to represent the 
adaptation of individuals to  the underlying parameters of their economic system. This work examines 
three applications of genetic algorithm adaptation in macroeconomic environments. 
In the first of these applications, the Arifovic and Masson (2003) model of currency crisis is 
simulated in controlled laboratory experiments with human subjects. An extended model of agents 
expectations is considered in which each investor has multiple rules, choosing one of them probabilis- 
tically in each period. The properties of time series generated by computer simulations are compared 
to those of human data. In each framework the time series of returns on emerging market debt is 
characterized by fat tails which matches features of empirical data. Additionally, the extended model 
of expectations better matches the duration statistics found in the experimental setting. 
The second application investigates the sufficiency of learning-by-doing for explaining negative 
macroeconomic output shocks in an evolutionary model of technological transition. The model 
allows firms to divide labour between two distinct technologies in a continuous manner. The ability 
of each firm to innovate within each technology is dependent on this choice for the division of labour. 
Contrary to previous literature, innovations are not transferable between technologies. It is argued 
that in such a framework learning-by-doing remains sufficient for periodic observations of negative 
macroeconomic growth. 
Thc final exa~rii~lation represents the first application of two-level learning in an economic envi- 
ronment in which the performance of potential rules is complementary across individuals. Two-level 
learning, or self-adaptation, incorporates certain strategy parameters into the representation of each 
individual. In this work, these strategy parameters determine the level of heterogeneity introduced 
into the environment. They evolve by means of mutation and recombination, just as the object vari- 
ables do. It is argued that self-adaptation over these parameters can replace the election operator 
proposed by Arifovic (1994) in order to attain convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
We use economic theory to calculate how certain variations in the situation are predicted 
to affect behavior, but these calculations obviously do not reflect or usefully model the 
adaptive process by which subjects have themselves arrived a t  the decision rules they 
use. Technically, I think of economics as studying decision rules that are steady states of 
some adaptive process, decision rules that are found to work over a range of situations 
and hence are no longer revised appreciably as more experience accumulates. (Lucas, 
1986) 
The rational expectations hypothesis asserts that economic outcomes do not differ systematically 
from what economic agents expect them to be. Rational agents form these expectations by opti- 
mally using all information pertaining to the expected outcome available. The rational expectations 
assumption has been used with great success in an enormous number of economic problems. It  has 
proved exceptionally powerful in solving economic models and developing comparative statics per- 
taining to important economic relationships. However, its use encompasses assumptions that prove 
very demanding and unrealistic in many applications. Alternatively, the assumption of bounded 
rationality maintains that economic agents form expectations in a manner that is only as optimal 
as information, resource and cognitive constraints will allow. It is argued that bounded rationality 
better describes the actual behavior of economic agents. In reality, individuals do not always behave 
in a truly optimal manner. Furthermore, individuals must discover the manner in which information 
is represented and the strategies for forming expectations using this information (Simon, 1957). 
Though work utilizing the rational expectations assumption typically outlines the comparative 
statics of the economic system in question, it devotes rather little effort to explaining the process 
of moving from one equilibrium to another. Utilizing the less demanding assumption of bounded 
rationality, many economists have turned their attention to the behavior of agents when the system in 
question is out of equilibrium. Models that result from this approach work to explain how equilibrium 
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behavior can emerge as the limit of an adaptation or learning process of boundedly rational agents 
(Dawid (1996), Lucas (1986)). If equilibrium is to result from the limiting nature of an adaptation 
process, this work must begin, of course, with a model of this adaptation. 
Some of these models assume agents behave as if econometricians, forming expectations according 
to econometric methods and based on historical observation. Examples of such work include those 
with expectation updating based on a simple moving average (Lucas (1986)), least squares estimation 
(Sims (1980), Marcet and Sargent (1989)), stochastic approximation (Robbins and Monro (1951), 
Woodford (1990)), or Bayesian learning (Blume and Easly (1982), Turnovsky (1969)). 
This work examines the application of a particular set of adaption models. Originally developed 
by Holland (1975), genetic algorithms are the best known representation of a class of direct random 
search methods called evolutionarg algorithms which are widely used to solve complex optimization 
and adaptation problems. Their use within economics is grounded on their ability to represent the 
adaptation of individuals to the underlying parameters of their economic environment. 
Based on the principles and mechanics of natural evolution, genetic algorithms are a set of 
search algorithms in which a population of potential solutions is encoded and subject to three basic 
genetic operators - selection, crossover, and mutation. These potential solutions may be candidates 
for an optimization problem or - as in economic systems - the belief or decision rules of an agent 
regarding an econo~nic problem. The algorithms cornbine the prirlciplc of 'Lsurvival of the fittest" 
with a "structured yet randomized information exchange to form a search algorithm with some of 
tllc innovative flair of hurnan scarcli." (Goldbcrg, 1989). Tllc initial population of rules is often 
randomly generated. Referred to as generatzons, subsequent populations are created by taking the 
best performing candidates from the old generation (selection) and exploiting these rules to introduce 
new solution candidates (crossover and mutation). 
The selectzon operator determines which candidates from the population of rules will be used to 
create the subsequent population. It is through application of this rule that the idea of "survival of 
the fittest" takes form. The performance of each specific rule is determined according to a fitness 
function. Fitness measures the performance of each rule with respect to the surrounding system 
and facilitates comparison between competing rules within the population. The standard selection 
operator, referred to as proportzonal selectzon, creates a new generation of potential rules by randomly 
drawing (probabilistically) from the old population. The likelihood of each rule being selected for 
use iri the sut)scqucnt population is proportional to its level of fitness. Once a rule is selected, it 
is replaced in the population of potential rules and has the opportunity of being randomly selected 
again. Tllcrein, a rule that has twice the fitness of another candidate has twice the likclihootl of 
being selected for the subsequent population. Over repeated draws on the current population it is 
expected to generate twice as many copies in the new generation. 
The replication inherent in the selection process represents "imitation of the successful" (Dawid, 
1996). It is analogous to the imitation effect within a population. In a population where the payoffs 
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of the individual actions are known to other members of the population, it is very plausible to assume 
that low payoff irldividuals will irnitatc the actions of those irldividuals employirlg highly profitablc 
rules. 
The crossover and mutation operators generate new rules in the population; they introduce and 
maintain diversity over this population. Following application of the selection process, crossover 
works by randomly assigning each rule to a pair. The crossover operator is applied to  each pair 
according to a given probability. If crossover occurs, a portion of the genetic material encoding each 
rule in a pair is swapped, yielding two new rules distinct from the pair that created them. This 
operator is often interpreted as analogous to some process of communication in which information is 
exchanged. Members of the population exchange information regarding their planned action. Some 
agents utilize this information, adopting part of the strategy of the other agent in combination with 
their own plan. The mutation operator is utilized following crossover. The genetic material encoding 
each rule is randomly altered from its current state according to  a given probability. This operator 
incorporates the effect of purposeful innovations, or trembling hand mistakes. 
Though the selection operator reduces the level of diversity over the population of rules comprising 
a generation, the crossover and mutation operators introduce diversity following this replication 
process. Of course, only newly created rules that outperform relative to  the rest of the population 
will be replicated under the selection process in subsequent generations. 
Arifovic (2000) notes that these models of adaptation hold several advantages over competing 
approaches. First, they allow for a population of heterogeneous agents' beliefs. Each belief's prop- 
agation is dependent on performance as measured by the payoff an agent receives in holding that 
belief. Modelling economic agents utilizing these algorithms imposes low requirements pertaining to 
their computational ability. In terms of their ability to explain the observations of actual empirical 
outcomes and experimental economics, they perform better than models with rational agents or 
alternative models of adaptive behavior. 
Arifovic classifies the research questions addressed by the study of these algorithms into four 
different categories. Thc first catcgory contains research related to  thc convcrgcnce and stability 
of equilibria in models with unique rational expectations equilibria. Many examples of this first 
category consider the application of genetic adaptation to the cobweb model. The original rational 
expectations consideration of this model is attributed to hluth (1961). Arifovic (1994) considers 
the learnability and stability of this equilibrium in a model of genetic algorithm adaptation. She 
compares these results to those of other learning algorithms and experimental evidence. This work 
demonstrates that genetic learning provides a better approximation of experimental results than 
other models of adaptation1 
'Arifovic (1994) compares the results of genetic learning to  those of three other commonly used learning algorithms: 
cobweb expectations, sample average of past prices, and least squares learning. 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The second category contains research where genetic algorithms are used as an equilibrium selec- 
tion device in models with multiple equilibria. Examples of such work include the examinations of 
an overlapping generations framework with fiat money (Arifovic (1995), Bullard and Duffy (1998a)). 
Here, the goveriir~ieiit filialices a constant deficit through seigiiorage. The model has two stationary 
equilibria, one associated with a lower level of inflation than the other. An important characteristic 
of these fraineworks is their convergence to the low stationary inflatioii equilibrium for deficit values 
and initial conditions under which least squares learning exhibited divergent behavior.' 
The third category includes work that examines transitional dynamics that accompanies the 
equilibria selection process. For example, Bullard and Duffy (1998~)  examine the application of 
genetic algorithm learning in the Grandmont (1985) environment. They consider a two period 
overlapping gcnerations model with preferences dependent on the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
In addition to two steady states, certain parameter choices are associated with periodic and chaotic 
equilibrium trajectories. The work demonstrates qualitatively complicated dynamics for long periods 
of time prior to convergence. 
The final category contains examinations of learning dynamics that are intrinsically different 
from the dynamics of rational expectation considerations. An example of such work is found in 
the modelling of recurrent currency crises. Rational expectations solutions to  the problem are often 
dependent on the existence of sunspot equilibria (Cole and Kehoe (1996), Jeanne and Masson (2000)). 
These solutions, however, do not explain how investors coordinate on a currency crisis path. Arifovic 
and Masson (2003) describe an evolutionary model that results in recurrent episodes of currency crisis 
that are driven solely by changes in investors beliefs; periods of excessive optimism are followed by 
periods of excessive pessimism. Currency crises characterized by recurrent periods of devaluations are 
purely expectationally driven. The model yields predictions regarding the behavior of the distribution 
of beliefs that are linked to recurrent devaluations. 
This dissertation contains three distinct applications of genetic algorithm learning. Each work 
contributes to the literature within one of the categories described above. In the chapters that follow 
this introduction, the second and third examine learning dynamics that are intrinsically different 
from the dynamics of the rational expectations versions of the models. 
In Chapter 2, the Arifovic and Masson (2003) model of currency crisis is simulated in laboratory 
experiments with human subjects. The framework modelling agents' expectations utilized by Arifovic 
and Masson is extended. In this model, each investor has multiple rules and in each period chooses 
one of them probabilistically. The properties of time series generated by computer simulations are 
compared to  those of the experimental data and the original results of Arifovic and Masson. Both the 
simulations and experiments generate times series of returns on emerging debt whose distributions 
2 ~ n  an exlension of lhis work, Bullard and D~iffy (l998b) model agents which live for more than two periods. 
They show that for larger parameter choices for the agents' length of life, convergence to the low inflation stationary 
equilibrium becomes less likely. In this extension, a similar result holds for larger specifications of the government 
deficit. 
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are characterized by fat tails. This feature matches the empirical data. 
Chapter 3 develops an evolutionary model of technological transition in order to investigate the 
sufficiency of learning-by-doing for explaining negative macroeconomic outplit shocks. Contrary to 
previous literature, innovations are not transferable between technologies. The assumption main- 
tained within this work is that thc only manner in which a firm may learn about a newer grade of 
technology is t o  devote resources toward production within it. However, firms are not required to 
fully commit to a single technology at  any given point in time. Firms may divide labour between two 
technological paradigms in a continuous manner. The ability of each firm to innovate within each 
paradigm is dependent on it's choice for the division of labour. Productivity gaps between old and 
new technologies result from a lack of accrued incremental innovations in the newer technologies. In 
all simulations, these gaps result in periods of negative economic growth in real income per capita 
despite the ability of firms to  adopt these new technologies in a non-discrete manner. For selective 
parameterizations of the model, although average quarterly growth statistics match the data  well, 
periods of negative economic growth occur with less frequency than observed in reality. It  is shown 
that in such a framework learning-by-doi~ig remains suficicnt for periodic observations of ncgative 
macroeconomic growth, though not with enough frequency to  match actual data. 
The fourth and final chapter of this work contains research related to  the convergence and stability 
of equilibria in the models with unique rational expectations equilibria. Here we extend the work of 
Arifovic (1994) described in the exposition of this category. 
Thc work corltained in Chapter 4 rcprescnts thc first application of two-level learning in genetic al- 
gorithms in an economic environment in which the fitness value of potential rules are complementary 
across individuals. Two-level learning, or self-adaptation, incorporates certain strategy parameters 
into the representation of each individual. In this work, these strategy parameters provide the like- 
lihood of mutation for the individual. These strategy parameters evolve by means of mutation and 
recombination, just as the object variables do. It  is argued that self-adaptation over the parameter 
governing mutation can replace the election operator proposed by Arifovic (1994) in order to  attain 
convergence to  a rational expectations equilibrium. While both adaptive mutation and the election 
operator are sufficient for convergence, self-adaptation may be more appropriate in non-static envi- 
ronments. This convergence, however, will require a strong selective pressure only attained through 
a transformation of the baseline fitness function. 
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Chapter 2 
Currency Crises 
Evolution of Beliefs, Experiments with Human Subjects 
and Real World Data1 
2.1 Introduction 
The role of investors' expectations has always been emphasized as a very important factor affecting 
the behavior observed in the financial markets. In particular, conventional accounts of the episodes 
of currency crisis focus on changes and shifts in investors' beliefs. However, modeling the changes in 
investors' expectations that might trigger currency crisis, without any apparent change in economic 
fundamentals, has not been given much attention in the existing literature. 
The traditional rational expectations approach leaves little room for modeling endogenous changes 
in investors' expectations that would trigger recurrent speculative attacks on currency.' The excep- 
tion are the models that due to the features of the underlying fundamentals exhibit multiple (static) 
equilibria where it is usually possible to add an exogenous sunspot process that governs switches 
between the neighborhoods of these equilibria. As a result, sunspot models generate dynamics of the 
recurrent currency ~ r i s e s . ~  However, they require coordination of investors' beliefs on a particular 
sunspot process falling short of explanation of why and how this coordination might take place. 
Over the last few years, advances have been made with the models that depart from the rational 
expectations hypothesis, and instead assume that investors are boundedly rational agents who have 
lThis chapter is based on a work co-written with Dr. Jasmina Arifovic, Simon Fraser University. Jasmina Arifovic 
acknowledges the support of the  SSHRC Standard Research Grant Program. We would like t o  thank Dan Friedman, 
Rob Oxoby, as  well as the  participants a t  the CEF  Meetings in Seattle (2003), ESA Meetings in Tucson (2003), and 
the Experimental Workshop held a t  the  University of Calgary (October 2004) for helpful comments. 
2 ~ o d e l s  tha t  incorporate imperfect and asymmetric information can give rise t o  one-time speculative attacks, but 
cannot generate recurrent currency crises. 
3See, for example, Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000), Jeanne and Masson (2000). 
CHAPTER 2. CURRENCY CRISES 9 
to learn and adapt over time. Kasa (2001) introduces adaptive learning into Obstfeld's (1997) 'escape 
clause' model and shows that learning dynamics, rather than sunspots, can generate switches between 
multiple steady states. Cho and Kasa (2003) introduce learning into a model of Aghion, Bacchetta 
and Banerjee (2001). Even when equilibrium is unique in this model, they show that the 'escape 
dynamics' of the learning algorithm produce the kind of Markov-Switching exchange rate behavior 
that is typically attributed to sunspots. Both of these studies assume homogeneity of investors' 
beliefs. 
Arifovic and Masson (2003) take a different approach and study a dynamic model of currency 
crisis in which heterogenous expectations of boundedly rational agents evolve through a very simple 
algorithm that involves imitation and experimentation. Their model generates recurrent crises that 
result from investors' change in expectations; periods of excessive optimism are followed by periods 
of excessive pessimism. Currency crises characterized by recurrent periods of devaluations are purely 
expectationally driven. The model also yields some predictions about the behavior of distributions 
of beliefs over time (that in fact are linked to recurrent devaluations). Direct empirical tests of these 
predictions cannot be done as we do not have any data concerning the behavior of investors' beliefs 
in real markets. 
Arifovic's and Masson's model is based on the idea of social learning where a population of beliefs 
of a large number of agents evolves together over time. This concept captures well the fact that a 
large number of investors participate in trading in real markets. Investors in real markets can also 
observe the behavior of some of the other investors (captured well by imitation). 
We extend Arifovic's and Masson's original framework by using a model (see Arifovic and Led- 
yard, 2003) where each investor has a collection of alternative beliefs and chooses one of them 
probabilistically. (The evolution of beliefs takes place at the level of an individual.) In addition to 
being interested in the robustness of the dyriarnics with respect to two difIerent learning paradigms, 
we employ a model of individual learning as it is better suited for direct mapping into the design of 
the experiments with human subjects. 
We simulate both modcls of social and individual learning for a large number of different pa- 
rameter values, and examine the observed dynamics. It is noteworthy that the model of individual 
learning is also characterized by recurrent currency crises. Other features such as duration of periods 
of devaluation and no-devaluation and the characteristics of the times series of the models' variables 
that are generated vary across diffcrcrit types of sirnulatioxis. 
As the appropriate data regarding investors' beliefs is not available, the approach we take in this 
paper is to test the model's predictions in simulations with the data collected in the experiments 
with human subjects. This way we can directly observe the evolution of investors' beliefs over time 
and compare the properties of the distributions generated in a model and those that result from the 
experiments with human subjects. The observed experimental behavior matches well the behavior 
of the boundedly rational, artificial agents along many dimensions. Most importantly, experiments 
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do result in recurrent instances of currency crises. We also examine the time series properties of the 
returns, both those generated by our model and those collected in the experiments. Both time series 
are characterized by 'fat tails' which is the feature observed in the real data on returns from the 
emerging markets (see Masson, 2003). 
In section 2.2, we first describe a simple balance of payments model with a representative agent 
and characterize its rational expectations equilibrium. This description is followed by an introduction 
of a model in which agents have heterogenous beliefs. We present our two models of learning, social 
and individual, in section 2.3. We describe our simulation and experimental design in section 2.4. 
The results of simulations are presented in section 2.5. The analysis of the results of the experiments 
with human subjects and the features of the dynamics of the changes in expectations are discussed 
in section 2.6. Finally, concluding remarks are given in section 2.7. 
2.2 A Model of Currency Crises 
2.2.1 Representative agent model 
We follow Arifovic and Masson (2003) in describing a simple model of a portfolio allocation between 
mature and emerging markets in which risk neutral investors decide to put their wealth either in an 
emerging market country or the United States. An emerging market central bank defends a currency 
peg using its foreign exchange reserves until those reserves reach some minimum value. 
The U.S. asset is riskless, and pays a known rate r*, while the emerging market asset's return, 
r t ,  is subject to devaluation (or default) risk as well as potentially decreasing returns to the amount 
invested. The agent puts a fraction A t  of hcr fixed wealth W in emerging market assets, such that 
expected returns on the two assets are equalized. 
Making explicit the dependence of r t  on A t ,  letting .irt be the probability of a devaluation and bt 
the size of devaluation, the condition for portfolio equilibrium is4 
Inverting (2.1), we can write this dependence as 
As in the canonical currency crisis model (Krugman, 1979), devaluations are triggered by the decline 
of reserves to some threshold level, which we assume to be zero. The change in reserves is equal to 
the capital inflow plus the trade balance, minus the interest payments on outstanding debt: 
4 ~ o r  convenience, cross product terms are ignored here. 
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where Dt = &W. The trade balance Tl is stochastic and is assumed to follow a Markov process; 
that is, it depends only on its lagged value. 
A rational expectation for the devaluation probability will satisfy 
.irt = Pr(Rt+l < Olno devaluation) 
t (2.4) 
This probability can be rewritten 
Assuming that the reserve level R1 is part of the representative agent's information set, and using 
the notation in Jeanne and Masson (2000), we can write this as 
This latter equation determines the rational expectation for the devaluation probability, given 
the stochastic process for Tt. 
The dynamics of (2.6) are difficult to characterize. However, it is shown in Jeanne and Masson 
that a simplified version of equation (2.6) can have multiple solutions. In particular, in the simplified 
case where B does not depend on .irt (just on nor on Rt, and if transitions between equilibria 
are described by a Markov transition matrix, then there is an unlimited number of rational expecta- 
tions solutions. In particular, for any set of n equilibria, another rational expectations equilibrium 
can also be constructed. 
2.2.2 A Simplified Model 
Arifovic and Masson (2003) have shown that the model of social learning in which heterogenous 
beliefs about 7r1, and bt that evolve over time results in recurrent currency crisis. In order to test 
the robustness of their model, they also examined the behavior of a simplified model in which only 
beliefs about .irt evolved, and the belief about bt was kept at the constant level. This model resulted 
in the same type of dynamics. Finally, a further simplification in which there is no stochastic element 
of the trade balance (resulting in Tt = Tt+l for all t)  did not affect the qualitative features of the 
dynamics. As the main objective of this paper is to compare the results of the simulations with 
5 ~ h e  case where B depends on both rt+l and rt can generate chaotic dynamics, as shown in Jeanne and Masson 
(2000). 
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the experimental data, we will work with this simplified model because it lends itself better to  the 
experimental implementation. 
Thus, we abstract from an evolving trade balance to one in which Tt equals zero for all periods. In 
addition, we assume that  all individuals share the same expectation regarding the size of devaluation. 
Specifically, b;,, = be = 1 for all i and over all periods t .  In this simplified model, equilibrium is 
no longer characterized by an  infinite number of solutions. (The inclusion of a non-stochastic trade 
balance will instead decrease the number of rational expectation solutions to just two.) 
Reserve levels are determined identically to the specification in equation (2.3), setting Tt equal 
to zero for all t.6 The rational expectation solution for an individual's probability assessment is 
therefore still characterized by equation (2.5). We make the following assumption for the function 
A t  = X(rt) 
ensuring that as individuals become more pessimistic, their investment in the emerging market 
decreases (ceteris paribus). We also assume X(0) = 1 and X(r,,,,) = 0. Under these simplifying 
assumptions, the rational expectations solution for rt (equation (2.5)) therefore becomes 
rt = P r t ( R t  + X(r t )W - (1 + r* + ~ ~ - ~ ) X ( r t - l ) W  < 01no devaluation) (2.8) 
In any situation in which Rt  > (1 +r* + T ~ - ~ ) X ( T ~ - ~ ) W  holds, the solution to this assessment has 
a unique solution. Specifically, rt = 0. Here, even as no funds are invested in the emerging market, 
it is impossible for a devaluation to occur. The reserve level of the emerging market's central bank 
is sufficient to cover all of its economy's current debt. 
A unique solution also results in any situation in which it is impossible to meet a shortfall in 
reserves with incoming emerging market investment. That is, when (1 +r*  + r t - l )X(r t - l )W - Rt > 
- 
W > 0 holds, a devaluation is certain, and r t  = IT,, is the unique solution. 
Multiple solutions exist for situations that fall between these two extremes. That  is, when incom- 
ing emerging market investment can meet reserve shortfalls, or when W > (1 +r* + r t - l ) ~ ( r L - l ) W -  
R t  > 0 holds, there are two possible solutions for r t :  rt = 0 and rt = r,,,. It  is impossible, with- 
out further specification, to select one of these solutions over the other. When r, takes the value of 
r,,,, a sclf-fulfilling devaluation takes place in which X(rt = r,,,) = 0 and through a devaluation 
of currency, Rt+l = o . ~  
GSetting Tt equal t o  T rather than zero does not change the solutions' characterization in any significant manner 
7 ~ h i s  result is in essence a stag-hunt gamc with a payoll dominated equilibrium. In a model incorporating Bayesian 
learning, Chamely (2003) considers speculative attacks in a similar spirit. Agents update their expectations regarding 
the number of other agents that believe the current fundamentals are sufficient for a successful attack. Essentially, 
there are two states of the economy, one in which there is sufficient speculators for devaluation, and one in which there 
is not. The mass of these speculators is an  uncertain parameter of this economy. While both models are essentially a 
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In the period following this devaluation, the above problem simplifies to the following 
As is the nature of self-fulfilling phenomena, when investors do not expect a devaluation, that 
is, when rt takes the value of 0, a devaluation does not take place. Importantly, this cannot occur 
indefinitely, as interest payments on emerging market debt will slowly diminish the level of reserves 
available. Eventlially, the cconomy will find itself with too fcw reserves to  covcr its interest outflow 
and a devaluation occurs. 
All of the above analysis is based on a framework where a one-period model (stage game) is 
repeated over time. In this respect, agents really have expectations of probability of devaluation in 
the following period. However, if we assumed investors were forward looking, then their rationality 
will imply the logic of backward induction, i.e. in case that devaluation can occur in some period t ,  
no investment in the emerging market will ever occur. 
2.2.3 Heterogeneous agents 
We now turn to the model with heterogeneous agents. There are n investors, each with constant 
wealth W, who form expectations of the devaluation probability, . ~ r , i . ~  Since investors are risk neutral, 
they will be indifferent between investing in the two assets when their ex ante returns are equal, and 
choose between putting all their beginning-of-period wealth into the safe foreign asset, at  rate r*, or 
into emerging market claims, a t  rate r t ,  depending on which expected return is greater. 
We assume that each investor is a price taker, and does not influence the marginal product of 
capital in the emerging market economy. Short selling of either asset is ruled out; neither portfolio 
proportion can be negative.' If A: is the share of 2's wealth in emerging market debt, then A: = 0 
or 1 as (1 + r*) > or < (1 + rt)/(l + .rr;).lo Thus, at any period t ,  the amount of emerging market 
deposits held by all foreign investors is 
Erilergirig market banks sct the interest ratc 011 bank deposits to reflect market cxpectatioris of 
the return on emerging market debt. We assume that banks do not form expectations of devaluation 
game of timing, in Chamely's work multiple periods are necessary for the existence of speculative attacks and these 
attacks are not recurrent. However, the emphasis of Chamley's work is examining policies' ability to  defend the 
currency peg, not in explaining recurrence. 
continue to assume that each investor h a s  an identical expectation regarding the devaluation size and that 
this expectation does not change over time, dte'" de = 1. 
'Similar qualitative results can be obtained if borrowing is allowed, but there are limits on leverage (such as a 
minimum capital requirement). 
1•‹1f the US rate were equal to  the gross expected emerging market return discounted by the expected devaluation, 
X i  would be indeterminate. 
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themselves; they just use the average of all investors' expectations as a measure of the expected value 
of devaluation. Thus, the interest rate on emerging market deposits rt is set equal to the U.S. rate 
plus a weighted average of the expected rate of devaluation. This equation, which is analogous to 
an interest parity (no arbitrage) condition, can be written 
rt = (1 + r*) n ( 1  + n;)'/" - 1. 
With different expectations, expected returns will be equalized only for the marginal investor 
whose expectation equals the average expectation. Each individual investor will make her investment 
choice on the basis of a comparison with the average expectation embodied in the interest rate. If she 
is more optimistic on emerging markets, in the sense of estimating a lower probability of devaluation 
than the average, then she will put all her wealth into emerging market debt; otherwise, she will 
put it all into U.S. assets. In this model, investor heterogeneity is key to determining the amount of 
emerging market assets held. 
As in the above described representative agent model, a balance of payments identity relates the 
changc in rcserves to  the trade balance (assumed for simplification to equal zero in all periods) plus 
the purchase of new debt by investors minus the principal and interest on maturing debt; assuming 
that there has been no devaluation or default: 
Reserves earn no interest, but they could just as easily have been assumed to earn r* 
Provided that Rt is above some threshold level (which we assume without loss of generality to be 
zero), there is no devaluation a t  t ,  i.e. ht = 0 (absence of superscript indicates that this is the realized 
value of depreciation, not its expectation). However, if reserves would otherwise be negative, there 
is a devaluation or default which reduces the amount that will be repaid on borrowing undertaken 
at t. That is, the ex post return for the lender will be (1 + rt) /( l  + dl),  where the amount of the 
devaluation is equal to the shortfall in the balance of payments that would have pushed Rt negative, 
divided by Dl: 
or using the above equation for Rt 
ht = [(I + rt-i)Di-1 - Rt-i - DL] (2.14) 
Dt 
Though the devaluation/default reduces the amount owed at t + 1, not t ,  we assume that, in this 
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case, balance of payments arrears are accumulated within the period such that reserves at t do not 
go negative but instead equal zero. 
2.3 Evolution of Heterogenous Beliefs 
Next, we describe the evolution of beliefs about probability of devaluation in the context of social 
and individual evolutionary learning. 
2.3.1 Social Learning - A Baseline Model 
We first dcscribe Arifovic and Massson's rnodel of social learning with boundedly rational agents who 
acquire the experience and knowledge needed to improve their performance over time. This model 
imposes weak requirements on agents' computational abilities. In this paper, the model of social 
learning will be referred to as our baselme model. The learning algorithm describes imitation-based 
adaptation of the agents' expectational rules (here a rule is just a point estimate for T:. Investors 
consider their own success and that of other investors and try to imitate those rules yielding above- 
average returns. In addition, they occasionally experiment with new expectational rules. 
Realized rates of return determine measures of performance of the expectations used at time t 
that we call fitness values. Performance, pi,  of each investor's rule is evaluated based on the ex post 
return on emerging market assets 
if investor i invested her wealth in the emerging market and to 
if she invested in the US market. In the case that due to devaluation the performance value of an 
expectational rule takes a negative value (& > r t ) ,  it is truncated to zero. Thus all the expectations 
that resulted in X i  = 1 receive the same performance value even though they may have different 
values of T:. Similarly, all those that resulted in A; = 0 receive the same performance value even 
though they may have different ~ t ' s .  
Investors update their expectations of ~f at  the end of each period by imitating rules that have 
proven to be relatively successful and by occasional experimentation with new expectational rules. 
These two aspects of expectations formation are described below. 
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Imitation At the beginning of each period t ,  investor i ,  i E [ I , .  . . , n] compares her expectational 
rule to a rule of a probabilistically selected investor j .  The probability, PT:, that an expectational 
rule j is selected for comparison is equal to the expectational rule's relative performance: 
We can think of the selection of an expectational rule j as resulting from a spin of a roulette 
wheel where each expectational rule is assigned a slot proportionate to  its relative performance value 
(proportional selection). Rules that performed better get larger slots than rules that did worse in 
the previous period, and thus well-performing rules have higher probability of being selected. Rules 
are selected with replacement. Once j is selected, investor i, compares the performance of her own 
expectational rule to the performance of investor j 's expectational rule. If the performance of her 
own rule is equal or higher, she keeps her own rule. Otherwise, investor i imitates (adopts) the 
expectational rule of investor j .  
Note that in case of devaluation, if bt > rt, expectational rules of the investors who invested in 
the emerging market yield a negative return, which is truncated to zero. Thus expectations of all 
investors who invested in the emerging market will receive performance values equal to 0 and will 
not be imitated. Only the expectations of those investors who invested in the US market receive 
positive, equal probabilities of being selected in this case. 
Imitation alone represents a type of herd behavior in that on average, over time, well-performing 
expectations will be imitated (followed) by a larger number of investors and on average, investors 
will encounter better-performing expectations more frequently. 
Experimentation Once the imitation is completed, each investor, i E [l, ..., n], can experiment 
with her expectational rule. Experimentation takes place with probability p,,. If the investor 
experiments with the expected probability of devaluation, a new expected probability of devaluation 
is determined by drawing a random number from the uniform distribution over the interval [0, .rr,,,]. 
The above describes the framework which is assumed to govern the interaction of the population 
of investors. If investors are not able to gather enough information to form reliable estimates of 
the future behavior of the markets, and based on that determine their optimal behavior, imitation 
of previously successful strategies seems a plausible behavioral assumption. This type of behavior 
is explicitly modeled in our framework using proportional selection such that expectational rules 
that yielded an above-average payoff' tend to bc used by more ilivestors i11 the following period. 
Experimentation incorporates innovations by investors, done either on purpose or by chance. 
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2.3.2 Individual Evolutionary Learning - An Extended Model 
Next we combine the currency crisis framework of Arifovic and Masson with the model of individual 
evolutionary learning used by Arifovic and Ledyard (2003). We describe the model and the way we 
are going to implement it in our simulations. 
Agent behavior 
At the beginning of period t, each investor, i ,  has a collection At of possible alternative expecta- 
tional rules. Each expectational rule of investor i is given by a real number that represents T;,, a t  
time t. A; consists of J alternatives, a),,, for j E (1, .  . . , J)." At each t ,  an investor selects an 
alternative randomly from At using a probability density n; on At.'' This alternative then becomes 
the expectational rule that agent implements at time period t. We construct the initial set At by 
randomly selecting, with replacement, J expectational rules from the set of all possible rules within 
a predefined range. We construct the initial probability IIi by letting n g ~ i , ~ )  = 1/J. 
After each investor chooses her expectational rule, we compute the emerging market interest 
rate, r l .  The next step is to determine the value of each investor's Ai(t). This is accomplished in the 
same manner as has already been described in the previous section. We use the rest of the model's 
equations to compute the level of reserves in the emerging market and extent of possible devaluation. 
Based on the information obtained at t ,  each investor updates her collection of alternative ex- 
pectational rules. This process consists of three pieces, computing foregone return, and performing 
experimentation and replication. 
Foregone return 
In updating A: and II;, the first step is to calculate what we call foregone returns for each alternative 
expectational rule in the collection. This is the (expected) return, given the information at t ,  that 
the alternative a;,, would have received if it had been actually used, taking the behavior of other 
investors as given. We use the notation ?(a; 1s:) to compute the hypothetical return of the alternative 
j that belongs to investor i's set of alternatives. 
For each alternative j ,  we determine the value of hypothetical A),,, given the value of T),,. Finally, 
using this value of A;, we compute the rules' foregone return. In this model, this represents their 
performance measure. 
" . I  is a free parameter of the behavioral model that can be varied in the simulations. It can be loosely thought of 
as a measure of the processing and/or memory capacity of the agent. 
121n essence the pair (A; .n ; )  is a mixed strategy for a at t .  
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Updating Af 
We modify A: with processes of experimentation and imitation analogous to the ones described above 
for social learning. Foregone returns play the role of fitness values. The process of imitation results 
in the increase in frequency of the better performing rules. In case of our extended model, it can be 
interpreted as a reinforcement of those expectational rules that resulted in higher foregone returns. 
While algorithmically the process of experimentation is performed the same way in the two 
models, it has different interpretation and impact on the dynamics. In the baseline model (social 
learning) it is a trembling hand random mutation. However, in the extended model (individual learn- 
ing), newly generated rules will not be automatically tried out when they are generated. They have 
first to increase their frequency, based on high foregone payoffs, in order increase their probability 
of actually being selected. 
We refer to the above described model of individual evolutionary learning as our extended model 
in the subsequent analysis.13 
2.4 Design of Simulations and Experiments with Human Sub- 
jects 
2.4.1 Simulations 
As mentioned earlier, we focus here on simulations in which 6: is n o t  allowed to evolve. This 
algorithm is referred to as the fixed - be case by Arifovic and Masson. Here, the expectational rule 
is characterized by a single real number, .rri (the probability of devaluation), and it is assumed that 
the expected amount of devaluation, 6:", is equal across investors and time. 
Agents (n) and Experimentation Rates (p,,) We first simulate permutations over the rate 
of experimentation and number of agents for the baseline simulation (one rule per agent). Holding 
the experimentation rates at 0.33, 0.165, 0.0825, and 0.04 we simulate over population levels that 
include 100, 75, 50, 25, and 12. As total wealth remains constant throughout these simulations 
(m), decreasing the number of agents has the effect of increasing the per period investment of 
cach individual. Dccreasing the expcrirnentation rate has thc effect of dccreasing thc amount of 
heterogeneity introduced in each period. 
'31ndividual and social learning can be complimentary. It is feasible t o  incorporate both types of learning within 
a single model of adaptation. A model of individual learning can incorporate imitation across individual sets of J 
rules. This intra-individual imitation, occurring between randomly chosen pairs of individuals every ti periods, allows 
individuals to mimic the strategies of other agents utilizing a fitness (payoff) criterion in order to  determine the relative 
success of the two sets of rules. An individual imitates the other pair's rules if, and only if, this criterion is met. 
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S t r a t e g y  S e t  Size - J In the model of learning in which agents have a set of alternative rules 
played probabilistically (A:,  II:), we simulate various permutations over the size of this strategy set 
J .  We allow the strategy set size, J, to equal 45, 15, and 5. For each parameterization of J, we 
simulate over the various permutations of population levels according to 100, 75, 50, 25, and 12, and 
of experimentation rates according to 0.0825, and 0.04. 
Simulations over very low specifications of the population of agents, n = 12, are used to gauge the 
impact of lower population levels on the simulations' dynamics. These are used in order to facilitate 
a comparison to experimental data  where, due to constraints, population levels are below that which 
would be considered appropriate to approximate perfect competition. However, these levels may 
not be sufficient for ensuring the efficacy of the learning algorithm as diversity over rules reaches a 
critically low level. This is a concern, foremost, for social learning where diversity is a direct function 
of population levels. This direct relationship is not a characteristic of individual learning, as J allows 
for a break between the direct relationship between population and diversity over rules. For this 
reason we expect, a priori, the results of the low population individual learning parameterization 
of the model to  be more rhobust with respect to  decreases in the population and therefore oRer a 
more favorable comparison with experimental data. Additionally, social learning entails knowledge 
of other individuals' rules which will not be a feature within the experimental environment. 
R i sk  Averse  Agents  - b, We extend the model of the portfolio choice of agents to one that 
includes a specification of risk averse investors. The equation that  determines investment in the 
emerging market, as derived by Masson (2003), is 
where, A2 is set to unity if the above equation yields a result strictly greater than one, and zero if 
strictly less than zero. Here, bi is a utility parameter negatively related to  the degree of risk aversion 
of thc particular investor. Risk neutrality is equivalent to setting this parameter to infinity. Each 
agent has the same measure of risk aversion (bi = b V i E [l . . . n]). 
We maintain a parameterization of bi equal to 1 and simulate the baseline model of expectations 
including the four population levels described above (100, 75, 50, 25, 12) and an experimentation 
rate equal to 0.0825. Using these parameterizations of population and exerimentation, the extended 
model incorporating bi is simulated with 15 rules per agent. 
Pa r ame te r i z a t i on  of Simulat ions As described above, the permutations over n ,  p,,, J ,  and 
b, include a total of 60 unique parameterizations of the simulations. All of the results of these 
simulations are presented in the Appendix. 
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2.4.2 Experiments with Human Subjects 
Our experimental design follows closely that of our extended simulation design in which 4 is equal 
to one for all investors and over all experimental periods.14 
Subjects were economics SFU undergraduates, third and fourth year. They volunteered, i.e. 
none were participating for fulfillment of any course requirement, and were paid a "show-up" fee 
and awarded an additional payment dependent on performance.15 We used Z-tree software for 
experimental economics developed by Urs Fischbacher to create our experimental environment. 
Initial Condit ions - Instruct ions Prior to the beginning of an experiment, subjects are given 
the following information: ( I )  the balance of payments identity that governs the currency reserves 
of the emerging economy's central bank in the following period; (2) the equation determining the 
rate of return in the emerging economy's asset market; (3) the fixed rate of return in the U.S. 
economy, r*, and an initial value of the emerging market rate of return, ro; (4) the initial level of 
investment in the emerging market, Do; (5) The constant wealth available for investment, W in each 
period; (6) the equation governing their portfolio allocation; (7) and the method according to  which 
experimental payoff is determined. This information is contained in a set of instructions read by, 
and to, participants of the experiment. Each experimental period proceeds in the following way: 
Subjects '  Assessment of T,Z At the beginning of each period, subjects are asked to quantify the 
probability of devaluation. At any time may subjects view the report of variables described in the 
previous section or the experiment pa,rameters and the history of relevant variables. Experimental 
subjects are prompted for their assessment of the probability of devaluation. In order to make this 
assessment more intuitive, they are asked to enter a probability over the span of [O, 101 rather than 
[O, .lo] = [O, T,,,]. Their assessment is then converted to a T:" by dividing by 100.16 The rest of 
the calculations are performed following the equation presented earlier.17 
R e p o r t  of Resul t s  Subjects are shown their resulting portfolio and rate of return, and their 
experimental payoff for that period. Subjects are also informed of that periods' ex  ante and ex post 
14An alternative experimental design may be found in the work of Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2004). Their 
work tests the predictions of global game theory with respect t o  private information using a reduced form Morris and 
Shin (1998) model. However, as consecutive experimental periods are in no way related in terms of fundamentals, the 
work cannot focus on the recurrence or duration of devaluation and no-devaluation periods. 
1 5 ~ h e  "show-up" fee was equal to  15 dollars. The performance dependent payment was calculated in a manner such 
that the average total payment across subjects amounted to  approximately 25 dollars. Subjects were informed about 
the nature of the total payment prior to  participation in the experiment. 
1 6 ~ h e  parameterization of n,,, is taken from the original work of Arifovic and Masson (2003) in order to  maintain 
comparability of results. It's original specification was in order to  align simulations' interest rate spreads with those 
of monthly emerging market data.  
17Under the unlikely scenario that a subject's assessment equals the geometric mean of all assessments, the subject's 
wealth is invested wholly in the emerging market if nj < nm,,/2, wholly in the domestic market if ni > nm,,/2, and 
split equally between the emerging and domestic markets i f  T: = ~ , , , / 2 .  However, these rules did not have to  be 
implemented in any of the sessions. 
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rates of return in the emerging market (before and after any devaluation, rt, bL and (1 + r t ) / ( l  +bt)), 
and of the total level of investment in the emerging market from the previous period, Dt-l. 
Trea tmen t  Payoffs A per period payoff for each subject is based on earnings in excess of thc per 
- - 
period investment. That is, a subject earns r*: when invested in the domestic market, rL: when 
- 
invested in the emerging market, and [(I + rt)/( l  + &) - 1: when invested in the emerging market 
in periods in which a devaluation takes place. Wealth, W ,  is not accumulating; each subject has the 
opportunity to invest a constant amount in each period that is not dependent on previous investment 
performance. Importantly, as was the case in the simulations' fitness functions, experimental profit is 
bounded below by zero. Cumulative experirr~ental profit translates into cash payment via a cox~versior~ 
factor. Total payment to the subject is the sum of a "show-up fee" and the converted experimental 
profit. 
Exper imenta l  subjects '  information se t  It is important to emphasize which variables are in 
the participants' information set and which are excluded. Each participant knows the complete 
history of total foreign investment, the ex ante and ex post emerging market return, and the extent 
of devaluation. However, they do not have information on the following: (i) the current level of 
currency reserves of the emerging market's central bank, and (ii) the devaluation threshold. We 
a.ssume that in reality, although reserve levels may be known by investors, the threshold under which 
devaluation occurs is unknown. We remove knowledge regarding the current level of reserves in order 
to avoid subjects' learning the devaluation threshold through repeated observation of devaluations. 
2.5 Simulation Results 
Initial Values The values of initial external debt, and reserves, US interest rate, as well as the 
value of total wealth were taken from Arifovic and Masson (2003). Thus, the initial values for external 
debt, and reserves were taken to be those prevailing in Argentina at the end of 1996. In these "fixed - 
be" simulations, the trade balance does not evolve. Interest r aks  and flows are converted to monthly 
data. All stocks and flows are expressed as ratios to GDP, so the relevant interest rates are actually 
the difference between the nominal interest rate and the growth of nominal GDP. For r* ,  the U.S. 
interest rate used was (0.05 - 0.03), or 0.001666. Variables of interest include 
where the value for total wealth, nW, was arbitrarily chosen to be twice Dl, T, was chosen as 
0.1, and 6haZ = 6f'i = 1. 
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2.5.1 Spread Statistics 
Masson (2003) studies empirical regularities within the returns on emerging market debt.'' The 
data indicate that daily changes in spreads are definitely not normally distributed, exhibiting much 
fat,ter tails. The study also finds generally significant first-order autocorrclation coefficicnt,.lg Our 
intention is to compare our simulation and experimental results to these two regularities. I t  is worth 
emphasizing that these results are derived from daily (not monthly) observations. 
First Di,ffcrcn,ce i n  In,terest Rate Spread 
S u m m a w  Statistics - Masson (2003) 
Standard  Deviation 0.04832 
Skewness -0.305 
Kurtosis 86.06 
Jarque-Bera 8,004,456 
Observations 27,842 
Table 2.1: First Difference in Interest Rate Spread - Summary Statistics - Masson (2003) 
In Table 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 of the Appendix, we include distribution statistics for the first difference 
in the emerging market's interest rate spread, [ ( l  + r t ) / ( l  + &) - (1 + r*)]. We will compare the 
qualitative features of these distributions to those of Masson (2003).'O 
Standard Deviation - Second Moment The standard deviation of the first difference in interest 
rate spreads vary between permutations of the simulations. However, all simulations' standard 
deviation fall in the [0.0242,0.0982] range. It is somewhat striking that even for parameterizations 
originally considered extreme, the standard deviation falls in this relatively small range. Notably, in 
the baseline sirriulatiorls (simulations 1 through 20), decreasing thc population levcl has the effect of 
increasing this measured standard deviation. 
- -- 
1 8 ~ e  uses a set of spreads on emerging market debt compiled by J P  Morgan using daily data from 31 December 
1993 to  19 July 2002. This data base comprises virtually the universe of all developing countries issuing Brady 
bonds and Eurobonds. The list of countries is the following (those included in JP  Morgan's so-called EMBI+ index, 
see J P  Morgan, 1995): Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Ecuador, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela. However, not all countries had 
bonds outstanding during the whole period 1993-2002; what observations existed were pooled to  study the distribution 
of spreads. 
l g ~ a s s o n  otes that this could be due to market inefficiencies that allow arbitrage opportunities to exist, or coi~ld 
reflect lack of trading so that spreads quoted do not correspond to actual transactions. 
''The data  presented in the Apper~dix to  this chapter represer~ts a subset of 120 different pararr~eterizations of 
the simulations. For brevity and parsin~ony, we exclude presenting parameterizations that yield results redundant to  
those considered herein. Distinct parameterizations within the population of simulations are associated with unique 
simulation numbers. Therein, the non-sequential numbering of simulations in the Appendix has been maintained to  
facilitate comparison with the entire sample utilized in other work. 
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Skewness - Third Moment From the distribution of the first difference in the emerging market 
interest rate spread for each permutation, we calculate the measure of skewness. In all of the 
simulations, the skewness statistic from this distribution measures positive falling on the range 
[0.0742,1.6117]; this result does not appear to aligli itself well with the empirical findings based on 
daily data. 
Kurtosis - Fourth Moment From the distribution of the first difference in the emerging market 
interest rate spread for each permutation, we calculate the measure of Kurtosis according to the 
following equation: 
Distributions with a kurtosis measure of 3 are referred to as mesokurtic, of which the normal 
distribution is a prime example. Those distributions with a kurtosis measure exceeding 3 are referred 
to as leptokurtic, and are characterized by slim or long-tails. Finally, those distributions with a 
kurtosis measure less than 3 are referred to as platykurtic (fat or short-tailed). Masson (2003) fixids 
a high value of kurtosis over daily first difference in interest rate spreads. Over all data sets that they 
consider, this measure is in excess of 80. In most of our permutations, the kurtosis measure far exceeds 
that of a normal distribution, reaching a maximum of approximately 56 in the baseline simulation 
with 100 agents, experimentation with probability 0.0825, and with a risk aversion parameter equal 
to 1 (simulation number 96). 
Although the values of kurtosis computed in our simulations do not reach the empirical measure of 
a.round 80, the measures are in excess of that associated with normal distribution (with the exception 
of three parameterizations).21 
Jarque-Bera The normal distribution has a skewness and kurtosis measure of zero and three 
respectively. A simple test of normality is to find whether the computed values of skewness and 
kurtosis depart from the norms of 0 and 3. This is the logic behind the Jarque-Bera (JB) test of 
normality. 
Where S refers to skewness and K ,  kurtosis. Under the null hypothesis of normality, J B  is 
distributed as a Chi-square statistic with 2 degrees of freedom. 
According to Masson (2003), daily change in spreads occur over a non-normal distribution. In all 
of our 60 permutations of the model, we reject the null hypothesis of normality using the Jarque-Bera 
''Parameterizations that do not have Kurtosis measures in excess of 3 are contained in simulations 77 through 79, 
inclusive. 
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test. 
Autocorrelation Coefficients We report the estimates of the first order autocorrelation coeffi- 
cient from an autoregressive regressiou irlcludiilg the first differelm ill spread measures ill Tables 2.3 
through 2.5. The estimated first order autocorrelation coefficient is significantly negative in all of 
our simulations. This contrasts the positive correlation reported in Masson (2003). However, it is 
important to note that the positive correlation in Masson 's work is over daily changes in interest 
rate spreads, rather than the monthly changes expressed in the simulations of this paper. It is quite 
likely that the monthly first difference in spreads are negatively correlated empirically, while daily 
are positively; a result very corrllnorl to fi~larlcial data. However, this conjecture requires validation 
using data not available at this time. 
Summary Overall, the regularities of the spread statistics are extremely robust over the permuta- 
tions of the parameter choices of the simulations, both baseline and extended. The most important 
finding is the robustness across the models of learning. In sum, regardless of the choice of model 
and for its parameterization, the distributiou of the first difirence in interest rate spread is posi- 
tively skewed with a Kurtosis measure well in excess of the normal and the interest rate spread is 
negatively autocorrelated. Although falling short of matching empirical data with respect to skew- 
ness and first order autocorrelation coefficients, standard deviation and kurtosis measures capture 
empirical regularities 
2.5.2 Duration Statistics over Parameter Permutations 
The Baseline Model - Comparison with Arifovic and Masson (2003) In our simulations 
of the baseline model, the observed dynamics are identical to those reported by Arifovic and Masson. 
The model exhibits recurrent instances of devaluations. We now consider the average duration of 
devaluation and no-devaluation periods over the various permutations of parameter specifications, 
using our two models of learning. In each simulation, the baseline initial values described above are 
used.2" 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the average duration of periods of devaluation and non-devaluation for 
each of the simulations. We differentiatc betwecn two definitions of devaluation. Our first definition 
corresponds to the standard definition of devaluation (the same was used in Arifovic and Masson). 
That is, a simulation is within a period of devaluation if bt is greater than zero (or, anytime reserves 
fall below their the threshold value). We refer to these as simply devaluations. They occur whenever 
22However, we would like to point out that  this comparison is made with qualification. The measures of kurtosis 
and skewness reported in Masson (2003) are those of daily data,  while in our simulations, the generated data refers 
to monthly intervals. 
2 3 ~ s  in Arifovic and Masson, each simulation is run for 10,000 periods. 
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the emerging market's currency undergoes a depreciation against the domestic. The ex post emerging 
rate of return is lower than ex ante rate of return. 
However, the fact that the emerging market's currency depreciated does not guarantee that 
the resulting rate of return earned from investing in the emerging market is lower than that of 
investing in the domestic market. A depreciation arising from reserves shortages may not be enough 
to make investing in the domestic market more attractive. Therefore, we also include a definition 
of devaluation periods that only include those in which the ex post rate of return in the emerging 
market is strictly lower than that of the domestic. We refer to these periods as dynamically relevant 
devaluations. 
Why is this distinction important? The answer is related to the evaluation of the payoff (fitness) 
function used in the simulations and experiments with human subjects. Although a devaluation 
may have occurred in the previous simulation period, if it was not large enough to drive the ex post 
emerging market return below that of the domestic market, rules that translated into investment in 
the emerging market will propagate. Therefore, simulation dynamics are more likely to be based on 
the dynamically relevant devaluations rather than the standard definition of devaluation. We discuss 
the results across different types of simulations. 
Baseline Simulations First, consider the baseline simulations (simulations 1 through 20). Con- 
sistent with the results of Arifovic and Masson (2003), holding the numbers of investors constant, 
decreasing the rate of experimentation (p , , )  decreases the average duration of periods of devaluation. 
Upon the onset of a devaluation, those investment rules associated with domestic investment earn 
higher rates of return than those associated with investment in the emerging economy. For a de- 
valuation to continue, investment must favor the domestic market, therein pulling wealth out of the 
emerging economy. This occurs when those rules associated with domestic investment are imitated 
by investors; a process that is inherent in the social learning algorithm. However, with higher rates 
of experimentation, this imitation is not as effective and the favoring of t,he domestic economy is 
less prominent. Increased experimentation decreases the ability of imitation and therefore the swing 
towards domestic investment required for sustained devaluations is less probable. 
Additionally, holding the rate of experimentation constant, lowering the population levels of the 
baseline simulations tends to decrease the average duration of periods of devaluation. However, 
this result does not hold for the two lowest specifications of p,,  where the duration measures for 
these parameterizations are already near their lower bound. As such, no decrease in the duration of 
devaluations is possible. This holds as well when considering periods without devaluations. Generally, 
decreasing the number of investors in the baseline simulation (ceteris paribus) has the effect of 
lowering durations of both devaluation and no-devaluation periods. 
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Extended  Simulations Our extended simulations of individual evolutionary learning result in 
shorter duration of no-devaluation periods when the size of agents' collections of alternative rules 
is relatively small. In these simulations, we observe a more frequent switching between states of 
devaluatiori and those with no devaluation. Specifically, extended sirriulatioris in which agents liave 
a collection of five rules and experimentation rates equal to 0.04 (simulations 76 through 80, inclusive) 
have average durations of successive periods without devaluation two to three times smaller than 
their baseline counterparts (simulations 16 through 20). This result holds across both specifications 
of the experimentation rate. 
This decrease in duration measures from the baseline model does not hold when the number of 
rules in the investors' collections increases to it's largest specification (J = 45, simulations 61 through 
65). Here, duration measures for no-devaluation periods are very comparable to the baseline model 
counterparts. 
We conclude that decreasing the diversity of rules available for each agent is very important for 
decreasing the duration of of no-devaluation periods.24 Smaller collections of rules are associated 
with shorter periods without devaluations. 
Decrcasing the size of cach agent's collection has the cffect of iricreasing the duratiori of devalu- 
ation periods. For both specifications of p,,, the duration of devaluations is longest with the lowest 
spccificatiori of the ~iumber of rules in this collcctiori (and with thc nurnber of investors, n equal to 
100). 
Holding the number of rules per agent and the rate of experimentation constant, decreasing the 
number of agents has the effect of lowering both the duration of devaluation and no-de~aluat~ion 
periods (consistent with the baseline results). 
Decreasing the experirneritation rate does riot seern to have any general effects in the extended 
simulations with high numbers of rules in agents' subsets. However, when these subsets are quite low 
(5 rules), lowering the experimentation rate decreases the duration of devaluation and no-devaluation 
periods. 
One could argue that some of the relatively smaller average durations of devaluation periods 
under the extended model of learning are empirically unrealistic. However, when we consider the 
simulations' duration statistics in light of our experimental data, these lower no-devaluation durations 
must be considered a success. 
Risk  Aversion - Baseline a n d  Extended  Model  From the consideration of risk neutrality, we 
incorporate risk aversion by decreasing the risk aversion parameter (b,) to a value of one. 
Consistent with the conclusions for the baseline and extended simulations considered above, with 
24Note that decreasing the number of agents in the baseline model would have the same effect on diversity. As 
described above, the resulting impact on duration statistics is the same. 
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risk aversion included in simulations, decreasing the number of agents (ceteris paribus) lowers both 
devaluation and no-devaluation duration measures. 
In the baseline model, holding all parameters constant and decreasing the risk aversion parameter 
tends to  increase the duration of devaluation and no-devaluation periods for simulations with larger 
numbers of agents (100, 75 and 50). For simulations in which the population is at one of its lowest 
two specifications, 12 and 25, decreasing the measure of risk aversion decreases the duration of no- 
devaluation periods considerably (duration measures for devaluation periods are already near their 
lower bound for these levels). 
Decreasing the risk aversion parameter in the extended model increases both the duration of 
devaluation and no-devaluation periods at all population levels. 
2.5.3 Average Assessment (T I )  - Regression Analysis 
Stylized facts regarding interest rate spreads leading up to and following currency devaluations are 
considered in the work of Tornell and Westerlnann (2001). In the consideration within this work, it 
is observed that interest rate spreads tend to increase in the period immediately preceding the onset 
of devaluation. This increase is estimated to be one percent. I t  is followed by a further increase in 
the period of devaluation of three and a half percent; a total increase of four and a half percent is 
observed leading up to currency devaluations. Following the onset of the devaluation, interest rate 
spreads tend to decrease. 
This decrease in the interest rate spread following devaluation is considered in the recent work 
of Kasa and Cho (2003). Their work is motivated toward explaining the recession that appears to 
follow periods of currency devaluation. While third generation models of currency crises accounted 
for this obscrvat,ion through their inclusion of "balancc sheet effects", currency crises are still thc 
result of exogenous sunspot affects. Their application of a model of learning and adaptation to the 
beliefs of the policy-maker and the agents makes endogenous the onset of crises; the onset of currency 
crises may be linked to the stochastic properties of their model of learning and the structural features 
of the economy.25 The fall in the interest rate spread may result from a mix of both risk premium 
effects and loose monetary policy. As noted by Kasa and Cho (2003), this loose monetary policy may 
be a concerted attempt to avoid the recession that follows devaluation. Of course, this policy tends 
to worsen the crises, deepening the impact of the initial devaluation of the value of the currency. 
Our test on the first difference in interest rate spreads is related only to changes resulting from 
t.he increases of decreases in the risk prcminm. We attempt to find changes in this spread, derived 
from changes in the premium, that are not predicted by the change in the preceding period. Tables 
2.8 t,hrough 2.14 include regressions on the first diffcrencc. in averagc. assessment (G). There is no 
2 5 ~ o t a b l y ,  in the model considered herein, currency crises are also linked to the  model of learning. However, as 
discussed above, currency crises are only a result of this adaptation on the part of agents; not to  the economic 
fundamentals of the emerging economy. 
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constant term included in these estimations. We include six explanatory variables, including the first 
lag of difference ill average assessmellt, and five durnlriy variables ill two regressions per simulation. 
Each dummy controls for specific periods within the simulations. The details of our analysis are 
contained within Table 2.2. 
Specification o f  Dummv Variables 
D l  bt = 0 and bt+l > 0 
0 2  6 t > O a n d b t - l = 0  
0 3  bt-1 > 0 and 6t-2 = 0 
0 4  b t=Oandbt -1  >O 
0 5  btPl = 0 and St-2 > 0 
D6 rt - bt > r* and r t + ~  - bt+l < r' 
0 7  rt - bt < r* and rt-1 - 6t-1 > r* 
0 8  rt-1 - bt-1 < r' and r t - 2  - bt-2 2 r* 
D9 rt - bt > r* and rt-l - St-l < r* 
Dl0  rt-1 - 6t-1 > r* and r t -2  - bt-2 < r* 
Table 2.2: Specification of Dummy Variables - Regression Analysis 
We use rt - bt as an approximation for [ ( l  + r,,)/(l + bt) - 11. We can interpret the estimated 
coefficient on a dummy variablc as thc change in in simulation periods with the characteristics 
as described in the above that is not explained with the lagged difference in c. The dummy 
variables rlurribered one through five are associated with the standard definition of devaluations, and 
those numbered six through ten are associated with the stricter definition of dynamically relevant 
devaluation. 
Our results for changes preceding devaluations coincide with that observed empirically. In the 
majority of parameterizations of the simulation, the period preceding the onset of a devaluation 
is characterized by a higher than expected interest rate spread. Evidence is found in the positive 
coefficient estimate of the D6 dummy variable. However, in the period in which a devaluation begins, 
0 7 ,  interest rate spreads are lower than would otherwise be predicted. Importantly, this measured 
effect is stronger than that inherent in the period preceding devaluation. As the lag of the first 
difference in intercst ratc spread has an estimatcd cocfficient that is always lcss than one we may 
also conclude that there is an absolute fall in the interest rate spread these periods. This result 
stands in contrast to the data summarized by Tornwell and Westermann (2001). 
Importantly, Kasa and Cho (2003) also find it difficult to model increases in the interest rate 
spread in the onset period of devaluation. Their conjecture is that policy makers "lose control" of a 
mild depreciation attempt.26 In contrast, the fall in the spread we witness stems solely from a fall 
26As noted by Kasa and Cho (2003), an empirical counterpart t o  this conjecture may be found in Britain's departure 
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in the mean investor sentiment regarding the likelihood of devaluation. Similarly, although following 
the onset of a period of devaluation we witness a very strong increase in the interest rate spread, 
0 8 ,  this effect is reflective of only an increase in the risk premium in isolation. Our model does not 
incorporate the potential of expansive rliorietary policy ill an effort to alleviate ecollornic recession. 
2.6 Experimental Results and the Dynamics of Expectations 
In this section we compare the results of our simulations to those obtained in the experiments with 
human subjects. We conducted a total of three experimental sessions. 27 We had 15 subjects in 
our first experimental session, and 11 subjects in the last two experimental sessions. The summary 
statistics are presented in Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.15. 
In all expcrimcntal scssions we observe negative correlation between the first difference in spread 
statistics, kurtosis measures greater than that associated with the normal distribution, and positive 
skewness. These regularities match the simulations very well. In the sessions with 11 subjects, 
standard deviation measures are slightly larger than those of the session with 15 subjects. We noted 
above that smaller number of agents in the baseline simulations yielded larger standard deviation 
measures. The 15 subject session has a standard deviation measure within the range of those 
associated with the simulations. Kurtosis measures for all of the sessions fall within the range of 
those for the various permutations of the simulations. 
The average duration of periods of devaluation and periods with no-devaluation are generally 
quite small when compared to those of the baseline Arifovic/Masson simulations (simulations 1, 
6, 11, and 16). Although we conducted only one session with 15 subjects, it is noteworthy that 
the treatment with a larger number of subjects also has larger durations of devaluation and no- 
devaluation periods. These are not unexpected outcomes. Our discussion above refers to falling 
durations for specifications with a smaller numbcr of agents; though these smaller durations are 
still larger than those of the treatments, especially with respect to no-devaluation periods. When we 
allow for smaller number of agents, the baseline simulations reasonably approximate the experimental 
results. 
We have also noted that the simulations of our extended, individual learning model are sometimes 
associated with far more switching between devaluation and no-devaluation states. A final point with 
respect to durations is that simulations of the extended model match the experimental data very 
well. Consider, for example, simulation number 80: an extended, individual learning model with 12 
agents, 5 rules each and an experimentation rate of 0.04. Its duration measures of 2.07 and 4.83 
match the 11 subject sessions quite well with respect to duration of devaluation and no-devaluation 
periods, respectively. Similarly, simulations with slightly larger collections of rules (15 rules per 
from the  EMS following the September 1992 attack; interpreted as allowing Britain t o  embark on a policy of lower 
interest rates 
27We set x,,, 0.10 t o  match the number used in our simulations. 
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agent, simulations 71 through 75) perform well in matching the 15 subject session. 
We now turn to the analysis of the behavior of the average assessment of devaluation in exper- 
iments with human subjects and in simulations of our baseline and extended model. Figures 2.1 - 
2.3 plot the average assessment of devaluation (6) and devaluation size (&) over time. Data for 
a subset of periods of a baseline and extended model simulations are given in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, 
respectively. The results of one of the experimental session are contained in Figure 2.3." 
A defining characteristic of the plots of the experimental average assessment is the relatively small 
range in which these measures fall when compared to those of the standard baseline simulations. 
For example, in the final ninety experimental periods of the session presented in Figure 2.3, average 
assessment is never larger than 0.05, and in only a very few periods does it fall below 0.02.29 A similar 
lower bound exists for the plots associated with the standard baseline simulations. However, in the 
majority of periods of devaluation, the average assessment climbs as high as 0.08. One may argue 
that the baseline simulation and the experimental results share a common lower bound for average 
assessment. It is important to note that within experiments, there are many situations wherein 
the onset of a devaluation is not associated with an average assessment close to the lower bound. 
This is rarely the case for the baseline simulation results. Additionally, the upper bound placed 
on assessment does not appear relevant for reversing these periods of devaluation in treatments, as 
average assessment rarely crosses the 0.05 level. 
The plots of the average assessment for our extended model look much more like experimental 
data. Consider Figure 2.2, plotting the extended model simulation's results. Here, the plot of average 
assessment looks very much like those plotted for the experimental session. Periods of devaluation are 
not necessarily associated with the lower bound on assessment, and the reversal of these devaluation 
periods occurs far before average assessment can climb to its upper boundary. In this respect, 
e~tended~individual learning simulations appear to match the experimental dynamics much better 
than the baseline specification. 
The extended, individual evolutionary learning simulations compare more favorably to the experi- 
mental results with respcct to duration statistics. Specifically, they exhibit more frcquent devaluation 
periods, and substantially shorter durations of no-devaluation periods. The range under which the 
average assessment occurs for the extended model simulations is quite smaller than that of the single- 
rule simulations. In addition to duration of devaluation and no-devaluation periods, this is a key 
characteristic the extended model simulations share with the experimental results. 
Our examination of simulation and experimental data indicates that devaluations result from 
'*1n order to facilitate comparison between simulation and experimental results, the following parameter choices are 
used for the baseline (Figure 2.1) and extended (Figure 2.2) simulation plots. The baseline simulation has 12 agents, 
one rule per agent, and a probability of experimentation set to  0.0825. The extended simulation is one in which 12 
agents have 5 rules in their collections and experiment with a probability equal to  0.0825. Figure 2.3, that of the 
experimental data,  is a session with 11 subjects. 
29With respect t o  average assessment, the results of the other sessions are both qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar. Importantly. there is nothing particular to  the specific experimental session we are discussing that cannot 
also be said of the other two sessions. 
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shifts in skewness of the distribution of .rrF'" Thus, the change of skewness plays crucial role in 
getting into periods of devaluation as well as getting out of them.30 We estimate regressions over 
the time series of the first difference in average assessment. Included as independent variables is the 
first lag of difiereiiced assessirieiit, and the duiniily variables specified above. 
We define as sentiment reversal increases or decreases in average assessments that are n o t  oth-  
erwise predicted b y  the  lag of the  differenced assessment .  The estimated coefficients on the D2,D4 
and 0 7 ,  D9 dummy variables are reported in Table 2.8 through 2.15. The numbers show that there 
is quite some variation over the coefficient estimates across the different simulation permutations. 
There appears little consistency in the coefficient sign of the lagged difference in the assessment, 
regressors. One thing to note is that in the simulations of the baseline model, both decreasing the 
rate of mutation, and decreasing the number of agents puts negative pressure on the 0 2  coefficient, 
often pushing it into negative territory. 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
We study a model of currency crisis where the only source of volatility that contains potential for 
speculative attacks and devaluation of currency are agents' beliefs. The beliefs are heterogenous and 
evolve ovcr time. Wc use two different fraineworks, social learning arid individual learning. As part 
of our methodology, we conduct a large number of simulations for different parameterization values 
to check for the robustness of the results. 
One of the striking results is that most of the main features of the dynamics are present for the 
whole range of different parameter values and over a wide range of specifications. These include the 
'fat tails', positive skewness, and negative correlation between the first difference in spread statistics. 
The 'fat tails' is also a feature that characterizes empirical data on the returns in the emerging 
markets. 
We also conducted three experimental sessions with human subjects where we simulated the 
same type of the economy. The features of the exhibited dynamics coincide with those of our 
simulations, i.e. fat tails, positive skewness, and negative correlation between the first difference in 
spread statistics. Regarding the duration of devaluation and no-devaluation periods, and the range 
of values within which the assessment of devaluation varies, our extended, individual learning model 
matches the experimental data well. 
3 0 ~ h e  model requires shifts in the skewness of the distribution over individual assessments in order to  obtain 
variation in the flow of investment. Therefore, shifts in skewness are required for devaluations. Import,antly, shifts in 
skewness are not necessarily associated with shifts in the average assessment, utilized to  determine the interest rate in 
the emerging economy. Therein, there is no theoretical link in this model between the shifts in skewness required for 
devaluations and changes in the interest rate spread associated with the average assessment. Importantly, skewness in 
the average assessment over individuals does not necessarily translate into skewness of the interest rate spread. The 
two have no theoretical relation in the model considered herein. 
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2.8 Appendix 
Penod Court 
Figure 2.1: Baseline Simulation - 12 agents, 1 rule per agent, probability of mutation 0.0825 
CHAPTER 2. CURRENCY CRISES 
Penod Courd 
Figure 2.2: Extended Simulation - 12 agents, 5 rules per agent, probability of mutation 0.0825 
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Figure 2.3: Treatment - 11 subjects 
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Simulation No. Population Rules p ,  b Count(deva1) Avedeval Avemon-deval 
Table 2.6: Count and Duration Measures - Dynamically Relevant Devaluations 
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Simulation No. Population Rules p, b Count(deva1) Ave.deva1 Ave.non-deval 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
6 1 
62 
63 
64 
65 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
Treatment 
Treatment 
neatment  
Table 2.7: Count and Duration Measures - Dynamically Relevant Devaluations (Cont'd) 
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No. POD. Rules w, b Lfl)?T; D6 D 7 0 8  D9 Dl0 
- -- - - 
Table 2.8: Regression Arialysis - First Difference in Average .ir - Dynamically Relevant Devaluations 
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No. Pop. Rules p,  b L( l )% D6 D 7 0 8  D9 Dl0  
Table 2.9: Regression Analysis - First Difference in Average .ir - Dynamically Relevant Devaluations 
(Cont'd) 
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No. Pop. Rules p ,  b L(l).irt D6 0 7  0 8  D9 Dl0  
Table 2.10: Regression Analysis - First Difference in Average .rr - Dynamically Relevant Devaluations 
(Cont'd) 
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No. POD. Rules v b L f l k  D6 D 7 D 8 D9 Dl0  
Table 2.11: Regression Analysis - First Difference in Average .rr - Dynamically Relevant Devaluations 
(Cont 'd) 
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No. Pop. Rules p, b L ( l ) K  D6 D 7 D8 D9 Dl0  
Table 2.12: Regression Analysis - First Difference in Average .~r - Dynamically Relevant Devaluations 
(Cont 'd) 
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No. Pop. Rules 
Table 2.13: Regression Analysis - First Difference in Average .rr - Dynamically Relevant Devaluations 
(Cont'd) 
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No. Pop. Rules p ,  b L( l )% D6 0 7  0 8  D9 Dl0 
Table 2.14: Regression Analysis - First Difference in Average rr - Dynamically Relevant Devaluations 
(Cont'd) 
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Population Rules p ,  b L(l)% D 1 D 2 0 3  0 4  D5 
Population Rules p ,  b L(l).rrt D6 D 7 D8 D9 Dl0  
Table 2.15: Regression Analysis - First Difference in Average .ir - Treatment Results 
Chapter 3 
Economic Growth 
Modelling economic growth with endogenous transition through tech- 
nological paradigms 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to model the process of technological transition a t  the firm level, 
and to investigate the implications of this model for macroeconomic aggregates. It will be argued 
that the slow diffusion of new technologies results from the fact that, although potentially more 
productive in the long run, these new technologies initially lack the accrued incremental innovations 
of their predecessor. They therefore are less productive during their infancy and diffusion of this new 
technology is slow. Additionally, this productivity gap between old and new technologies may cause 
temporary negative aggregate output shocks if a sufficient number of firms adopt the new technology 
simultaneously. 
Long-run growth in income per capita requires increases in productivity. Some productivity 
improvements result from incremental innovations within a given technology being employed. They 
are a result of what is referred to as learning-by-doing, or learning-by-using. Improvements to 
productivity through incremental innovations occur with diminishing returns. As the return to 
productivity of learning-by-doing within a given technological paradigm diminishes, the only way 
to achieve further improvements is through technological advancement. Technological advancement 
refers to firm appropriation of ncwly discovcrcd techriologies with higher productivity potential. This 
is often referred to as radical innovation. 
In the pursuit of profit maximization, firm's adopt new technologies only in order to appropriate 
the potential productivity improvements inherent within them. However, this potential level of 
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productivity may only be achieved after considerable accumulation of incremental innovations. Prior 
to the accumulation of these innovations, a newly adopted technology may be less productive than its 
predecessor despite the fact that it has a higher overall productivity potential. Therefore, a firm may 
be required to accept a short run decrease in productivity in order to earn the higher productivity 
level of the new technology through learning-by-doing. 
The manner in which innovation and technological progression is modelled within this work is 
consistent with some key macroeconomic phenomena. In particular, negative shocks to economic 
growth are a possible characteristic of paradigm transition at the firm level. Falls in productivity 
associated with technological progression result in periods of negative economic growth. These 
negative shocks to productivity are not exogenous, as is assumed in many works for simplification, 
but inst,ead a result of the prorcss of technological progression at the firm lcvel. 
Previous considerations of the importance of learning-by-doing include Parente (1994), Lucas 
(1993), and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996). Each of these works examine the firms' decision regarding 
technological upgrades in light of it's expertise in it's current and potential technological grade. 
In order to highlight the differences between this work and it's predecessors, consider the work of 
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996). Their work contains a one-agent, Bayesian model of learning-by-doing 
and technological choice. The firm is myopic, and maximizes current period return in each period 
by production utilizing a single technological grade. Experience yields information which raises 
productivity and improves decisions. This is modelled through Bayesian updating. Importantly, this 
information applies not only to the current grade of technology in use by the firm, but also superior 
grades; information is transferable. Finally, there is no recall of old technologies, and the size of the 
upgrade is limited. 
Although firms within the model of this work are myopic, each is heterogeneous in their productiv- 
ity characteristics. Experience yields information which raises productivity. However, transferability 
of this information is not a characteristic of the model herein. This characteristic stems from con- 
sideration of an important question. Is the process governing the transfer of knowledge on prior 
variance of newer grades of technology in the information set of the firm? In previous literature, it 
is assumed that firm's know the process and the manner in which it changes through progression 
of technological grades. This information pertaining to newer grades of technology is available even 
before the firm has devoted any resources toward it. The assumption maintained within this work 
is that the only manner in which a firm may learn about a newer grade of technology is to devote 
resources toward production within it. These resources take the form of productive assets, labour 
and capital. Firm's may contribute a portion of their resources toward a newer technological grade 
while maintaining production in it's predecessor. Therefore, while firms may not gain information 
regarding a newer technology without using it in the production process, it does not need to fully 
commit to a single technology at any given point in time. 
The manner in which technological progression and learning is modelled in this work makes it 
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definitively evolutionary. It is a model characterised by heterogeneity, experimentation, and selection. 
It has important advantages over other rrlodels in the literature in that it offers a natural model of 
experimentation by agents and allows consistency with Nelson and Winter's (1982) interpretation of 
Schumpetarian competition. 
Nelson and Winter's (N&W) conception regarding the metaphorical evolutionary process of 
Schumpetarian competition yields model characteristics that are distinct from their interpretation 
of those inherent within "orthodox" economic considerations. First, they emphasise a population 
perspective wherein an 'industry' or 'economy' is seen as a taxonomic class incorporating a certain 
degree of variety of processes and/or products. This variety must, in principle, be transferable be- 
tween different firms or agents. A certain similarity of the search spaces of firms is required for 
t,his t,o bc possible. Howcvcr, there may be major differenccs with respcct to the 'distance' bctween 
different sources of knowledge (Andersen 1996). 
Second, N&W heavily emphasise the importance of the natural introduction of variety and the 
economic selection over this variety. This variety introduction is founded on the individual's pursuit 
of non-normal profit. However, N&W consider this variety and selection only within an economic 
pattern. In other words, N&W emphasise change which follows "natural trajectories" within given 
"technological regimes" (N&W 1982, 258-262) rather than radical change. 
According to Nelson and Winter, "a vast array of particular models can be constructed within 
the broad limits of the theoretical schema" but the "enormous generality" of the schema cannot 
be exploited immediately (N&W, 1982, 19). In order to obtain real understanding about how to 
handle their powerful family of models, N&W prefer to concentrate on "very simple examples" and 
to "distinguish sharply between the power and generality of the theoretical ideas we employ and the 
much more limited results that our specific efforts have yielded thus far." (N&W, 1982, 20). The 
model presented herein extends the complexity of the N&W examples in a manner that also extends 
what they refer to as their "limited" results. 
The model is built from a simplified version of the MOSES training-and-innovation model pro- 
posed in the work of Ballot and Taymaz (1994, 1996, 1997, 1998). The MOSES model is a complete 
Micro-to-Macro simulation model of the (Swedish) economy. Their model highlights the interac- 
tion between human capital and innovation. Hcrc, firms dccide on thc allocation of funds bctween 
training, R&D and production. These decisions in turn affect macroeconomic growth. 
Our simplification of the model is for reasons of parsimony. In order to model technological transi- 
tion in a manner that is consistent with negative macroeconomic output shocks, firms' investment in 
R&D is not strictly required. Nor, it will be argued, is the emphasis placed on R&D warranted when 
one looks at a significant technological transitions of the past; specifically, the Industrial Revolution. 
In the following section, we highlight the fact that a key element of technological advancement, 
and therein economic growth, is learning and adaptation on the part of economic agents employing 
the new technology. Section 3.3 of this paper will explore the previous examinations by Ballot and 
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Taymaz, and highlight the motivation for the proposed simplification. Section 3.4 will examine in 
detail the algorithm used in order to  model economic growth in this piece. Section 3.5 examines 
some of the key results of the model's simulation, and Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Background - The Industrial Revolution as Transition 
Through Technological Paradigms 
3.2.1 Some empirical regularities and the slow transition to the factory 
system 
Five explanations for the slow transition to the factory system are summarized by Pereira (2002): (1) 
the competitiveness of the putting-out systerri, (2) iritelest groups, (3) the low margin of efficiericy 
of the new factories, (4) social learning and technological spillovers, and (5) the "bandwagon" or 
"gold rush" effect. Herein, our coriccrri will be in capturing the latter three of these five in a model 
of technological progression. We examine these three below. ' 
Low margin of efficiency of the new technologies of factories - Experimentation As 
argued by Pereira, a t  the inception of the Industrial Revolution, early factories were not more 
effective than historic industries. Technologies were crude and took time to  become fully operational 
and productive. Furthermore, tlicrc were lrialiy tcclinical difficulties associated with the development 
of some technologies which prevented their earlier diffusion. Consequently, the efficiency of the new 
technologies was initially low, but slowly improved during a period of highly intensive learning-by- 
doing. After inventors, technicians and factory workers solved these initial technical problems, the 
productivity of the sectors associated with the new technology increased rapidly.2 
Social Learning - Imitation Dissemination of knowledge among potential industrialists was 
crucial for the diffusion of not only new machines, but also of the factory system. As Aghion and 
Howitt argue: 
Thc way that, a, firm typically learns to  use a new technology is not, t o  discover cvcrything 
on its own but to  learn from the experience of other firms in a similar situation, namely 
other firms for whom the problems that must be solved beforc the new technology can 
be successfully be implemented bear enough resemblance to  the problems that must be 
solvcd in this firm. (Alghion and Howitt, 1988, pp.129) 
'Atkenson and Kehoe (2003) examine similar characteristics in their consideration of the slow adoption of tech- 
nologies associated with the Second Industrial Revolution 
2 ~ o r  an  overview of the evidence, See Pereira (2002) 
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Crit ical  Mass  a n d  t h e  "bandwagon" effect - Selection Early examples of proto-factories 
were not totally uncommon before the Industrial Revolution. Industrial success, however, was a 
phenomenon that began mostly after the Industrial Revolution. Most proto-factories did not manage 
to survive for considerable periods of time (Crouzet, 1985). Furthermore, most of them did not 
employ mechanical machines (Landes, 1986). Nonetheless, proto-industrialization shows that there 
was a long trajectory of mechanization that stretches back to earlier decades and, in some cases, 
centuries (Bekar and Lipsey, 2001). 
What changed? After early industrialists such as Arkwright and Watt obtained spectacular profits 
with the new factories, a bandwagon cffcct cnsucd and factories of all sizes sprung up. As argued 
by Rosenberg (1996), pervasive uncertainties are often the norm in the development and application 
of new technologies. As argued above, several technical problems complicated an entrepreneur's 
decision of whether or not to invest in new technologies. Investing in new technologies was an 
expensive and risky business in which the distribution of incomes was truly uncertain. However, 
this distribution of incomes was likely skewed to the lower end, as can be attested by the relatively 
high number of bankruptcies during the end of the process of proto-industrialization and the early 
stages of the Industrial Revolution. Many investors preferred either to invest elsewhere, or to delay 
their investments, rather to engage in the risky endeavor (Crouzet, 1985; Pollard, 1965). These 
problems were eventually solved by social learning and the achievement of a critical mass in the new 
technology, as e~nulatio~i could now occur Inore pro~nineritly and profitably allowi~ig thc survival rate 
to increase. 
In te rmedia te  Adoption In their consideration of the Second Industrial Revolution, the adoption 
of the modern technology of electricity, Devine (1983) and David (1990, 1991) stress the complete 
redesign of the manufacturing process that accompanied this transition. Technology and the or- 
ganization of the manufacturing process are two sides of the same coin. While the manufacturing 
processes associated with old and the new technology were radically different, the transition oc- 
curred through a process of evolution. Between the old manufacturing setup and that associated 
with electricity were two intermediate stages in which the higher technology was mixed with older 
styles of the ~riariufacturirig process. These intermediate stages represent periods in which firrris were 
not fully committed to the newer technology and its ideal form of organization. Their production 
process shared technologies from both the new technology and its predecessor. 
3.2.2 Summarizing the qualitative features of technological transit ion 
Summarizing the above discussion pertaining to the Industrial Revolution, the technologies encom- 
passing the Industrial Revolution were available long before they were broadly appropriated by firms. 
Firms did not invest in new technology, as it was inferior to its predecessors in terms of productivity. 
Those firms that did invest in the new technology were failures. Social learning was an important 
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factor bringing the productivity of new technologies in line with, then surpassing that of old tech- 
nologies. Oncc this occurrcd, thc profits carried by those firms utilizing new technologies drew other 
firms into this new technological paradigm.3 
The Industrial Revolution has been the best documented and arguably the most important tech- 
nological transition. Our goal throughout the remainder of this work will be to model the process of 
technological transition at higher frequencies in a manner consistent with these qualitative features. 
Therein, it is assumed that these important regularities are present in all transitions, though possibly 
in smaller magnitudes depending on the nature of the newer technology. 
3.3 Background - The theoretical framework 
3.3.1 The general approach of Ballot and Taymaz 
A model that captures some of the aforementioned historical regularities of technological transition 
and incorporates the importance of learning is contained in various works by Ballot and Taymaz. In 
these works, long run growth in productivity is achieved only through transition towards superior 
technological paradigms. Each paradigm has an upper bound with respect to improvements in 
productivity obtained through learning-by-doing. 
A technology is represented in the model by a set of techniques. Each technique is assumed to 
take only one of two possible values: 0, or 1. For each technological paradigm, there is an optimal 
organization of techniques that guarantees maximum performance in terms of capital and labour 
productivity. This is referred to as the global technology. The technological level of the firm within 
a paradigm is measured by its closeness to the global technology. A particular paradigm's optimal 
organization of techniques is distinct from that of any other paradigm's. Therein, each paradigm may 
be characterised by the organization of this given set of techniques and the resulting productivity 
that this optimal organization of techniques results in. 
Genetic algorithms are used as a tool to generate new technologies within a paradigm. Firms 
recombine their own sets of techniques to obtain new ones, recombine their sets with those of other 
firms, or invent new sets entirely. These analogies pertain to the genetic opererators of recombination, 
imitation and mutation, respectively. Only innovations that improve productivity are adopted (the 
genetic election operator). 
Firms m~ls t  allocate available resources towards different uses. They must invcst in physical 
3Alcaly (2003) also considers previous cycles of technological change and economic reaction, such as the invention 
of steam power and later electric power, the development of the internal combustion engine and adoption of mass 
production techniques in automobiles and steel. Comparing innovations in semiconductors, software and comn~unica- 
tions technology with those of earlier periods suggests the traumas of the last few years, including the Internet boom 
and crash, are predictable growing pains. He argues that such changes do create new economies that are qualitatively 
better than the economies they replace, but more slowly and erratically than people expect a t  the time and with 
bigger problems along the way. 
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assets since they embody new technology and because they depreciate. They must invest in specific 
and general human capital in order to  facilitate incremental innovations and imitation of other 
firms, respectively. Contrary to  specific human capital, general human capital is transferable and 
not a direct factor in production. Finally, they should invest in R&D in order to facilitate radical 
innovations. Profits result from the market process. It is assumed that the precise relation of the 
above experiditures is far too complex to be fully uriderstood by the firrri. Consequently the firms1 
decisions must be modelled as boundedly rational rules with integrated learning. 
3.3.2 The transition between technologies 
It  is important to  note that for paradigm transition in the Ballot and Taymaz framework requires 
each firm to devote resources directly into accumulation of general hu~rlarl capital and R&D, neitlier 
of which contributes directly to production. This pulls resources away from the actual production 
process. If enough firins crigagc in such irivestmcrit, there is the theoretical possibility of a negativc 
output shock. This possibility interferes with the examination of learning-by-doing for creating falls 
in productivity sufficient for negative output growth. 
Ballot and Taymaz assume that progression requires that at least one firm engages in sl~fficient 
R&D investment to  facilitate a radical innovation. Once this radical innovation occurs, the firm 
in which it took place is forced into producing only in the new technological paradigm. Only then 
may other firins imitate the transition to  the new paradigm.4 Contrary to  the Ballot and Taymaz 
approach, in the model presented in this work, all firms have available the opportunity to  produce 
in the newer paradigm. Firms are not required to  invest in R&D in order to facilitate production in 
the new paradigm. 
Radically innovative firms still face the same difficulties as in the Ballot and Taymaz setup. The 
first firms to implement a radical innovation may not be very successful since it may be less produc- 
tive, as the technology in the lower paradigm has been improved through incremental innovations. 
Notice that the potential for negative macroeconomic output shocks is still inherent. Although a 
new technological paradigm has more productivity potential, it has not undergone the incremental 
innovations that the older paradigm has. It therefore may be less productive. If this is the scenario, 
a negt ive output shock may be observed if a. sufficient number of firms shift production into the 
newer paradigm. Importantly, this captures an aforementioned feature of the Industrial Revolution; 
transition into the new technologies was hampered due to the fact that these were temporarily less 
productive than older ones. Additionally, firms did not require an outright investment in R&D in 
order to take advantage of new technologies. Firms had the technology a t  there disposal and chose 
to continue using its predecessors. 
4 ~ o t e  tha t  if the firm that  originally observed the radical innovation fails, radical imitation is no longer possible. 
A new firm must go through the same process of radical innovation in order to facilitate progression. Although the 
radical innovation has already taken place, because there is no firm producing in the newer paradigm another radical 
innovation must take place before imitation is available. 
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3.3.3 Technological transition without R&D 
In dropping the assumption that R.&D is reqiircd by firms prior to adoption, we require a new 
process for the transition through paradigms. In the model presented here, it is assumed that firms 
may devote a chosen percentage of their labour force to  production in the newer paradigm. This 
simplifying assumption allows for incremental innovation by all firms, regardless of scale. Again, 
they need not discover this paradigm through radical innovation or imitation. However, in order to 
maintain production in a paradigm, they must devote a minimum percentage of their labour towards 
it. 
Each paradigm has a minimal level of labour required in order t o  make it available as a viable 
production technology. If a t  any time the firm does not devote sufficient labour to  a technology, it 
becomes  ina available for use in the production process. Importantly, if a firm splits its labour between 
two technological paradigms, and the minimum labour investment is maintained in each, the firm 
may produce using both technologies. This is distinctly different from the Ballot and Taymaz setup. 
In the model herein, firms devote labour to technological paradigms in a continuous manner. In their 
work, once a firm makes a radical innovation or radically imitates, it is forced into producing with 
the newer technology in full. Firms in their model cannot adopt a new technology incrementally. 
As in the Ballot and Taymaz framework, firms make incremental innovations through learning-by- 
doing and imitation of other firms that are producing using the same technological paradigm. This 
is modelled using genetic learning operators. However, firms learn only according to the relative 
division of labour. That is, their ability to  achieve incremental innovations within a paradigm is 
directly correlated to  their choice regarding the division of labour applied to  production using this 
technology. 
This setup has an important characteristic. A motivation of this work is in detailing the possible 
sufficiency of learning-by-doing for ricgative iriacroecono~riic output shocks. This model of learning 
makes it more unlikely for these to  occur. As noted above, a barrier for firms' progression into 
newer paradigms is the possibility that these technologies are less productive, as they have not 
accumulated the incremental innovations that the preceding paradigms have. If firms are given the 
ability to engage in production using the new technology continuously rather than discretely, they 
may remove this barrier by accumulating incremental innovations in the newer paradigm while not 
dcvoting all of their production capabilities towards it. Essentially, firms have the ability to  lesscri 
the overall productivity effects on their production process by slowly moving into the newer paradigm 
rather than shifting all of their resources in whole. 
It is important to  note that the model presented here differs in another fundamental manner from 
that of Ballot and Taymaz. As discussed below, some markets are simplified from that of the Ballot 
and Taymaz simulations; particularly the labour market and the removal of intermediate goods for 
production. Ballot and Taymaz rely on the MOSES model of the Swedish economy; a model that is 
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beautiful in its complexity.' The work presented in this paper outlines a stand-alone, self-contained 
simulation that is accessible and easily adapted for other considerations. 
3.4 The Model 
3.4.1 Setup 
Firms'  Variables - Initialization 
Prior to  sii~lulation, firm specific variables and characteristics are initialized. This irlitialization 
occurs in what is referred to  as period zero. N firms are created and for each firm, 2x technology 
sets are drawn at randonl. The technology employed by a firm can be represented by a number 
of "techniques", FP = {ff,  f[, ..., f:), where FP is the technology used by the firm in paradigm 
P, and f: is the i 'th technique. A technique is assumed to have only one of two possible values, 
f: E {fjP, f:P) = ( 0 , l ) .  In simulations, the firm and global technology will be represented by a 
k element binary vector. We refer to the global technology as Tp .  Notice that technology sets are 
paradigrn specific, P .  The firm carries with it x sets per paradigm. A firm may only produce in two 
paradigms at  a time. Therefore, they must carry with them 2 2  total sets. 
Each firm is endowed with a paradigm variable, pl ( j  = 1.. N ) ,  which defines the lowest paradigm 
it is currently producing in. This variable is set to 1 for all firms in period zero. Additionally, each 
firm is cndowed with a "switch gcne". This gene is a binary string that will be converted into a real 
number in each period in order to determine the relative use of a firm's labor between two relevant 
paradigms. The relevant paradigms are pl and pl + 1. These are the paradigms that, a t  any given 
point in time, a firm may devote labor and capital for production. For all firms, in period zero it is 
set to a string that when converted is equal to  zero; i.e. the binary null. We refer to  the real value 
equivalent of the "switch gene" for firm j as &. 
All firms undergo selection every m periods (see below). Selection is the process in which firms up- 
date their paradigm variable in order to mimic more successful firms, or experiment with new values 
in order to capture non-normal profits. Firms are separated into groups of equal size, Nlm.. A firm 
undergoes selection with the other members of its group, each group due for selection sequentially. 
Global  Variables - Initialization 
In addition to initializing firm specific characteristics, the global variables of the simulation require 
initialization. By global variable, we refer to variables shared by each firm throughout the entire 
simulation. 
'See Eliasson (1991), and Taymaz (1991) for a description of the MOSES model and data  set 
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First, an upper bound is placed on the number of paradigms, p.6 For each paradigm p < p, the 
global technology set, T ~ ,  is drawn by randomly choosing the bits contained in each binary string. 
Second, a minimal labor investment is created for each paradigm, m p  E [O,1] V p I 1 5 p 5 
P. If at any time a firm does not invest at least nz, percent of its labor in paradigm p, it cannot 
produce in t,hat, paradigm. A firm produccs in two paradigms only if n ~ ~ , + ~  < Gj < 1 - nip,. 
3.4.2 A simulation period 
Following initialization, the simulation cycles through a predetermined number of periods, T. Each 
simulative period is characterised by each firm and household undergoing the period stages outlined 
below. 
Modelling Households - Aggregate Input Supply 
Households are modelled using an overlapping generations framework where the total population in 
every period equals 2L, equally divided between young and old. We use the notation that subscripts 
denote birthdates and parentheses denote real time. Individuals born within a generation are indexed 
by a superscript i E (1,2, ..., L). Utility for the individual is defined over consumption in each period 
of life according to the following equation. 
Only young individuals have the opportunity and ability to work. Each young individual is 
endowed with a normalized unit of time with which she may engage in labour in order to earn wages. 
We abstract from the labour-leisure choice potentially facing individuals and simply assume that each 
agent enjoys no disutility from working. As such, each young individual supplies this normalized 
unit of labour inelastically, earning the wage w(t) when young. 
Other than this normalized labour unit, agents are born with no endowment. The single, perish- 
able good produced in this economy may either be consumed or used as an input into production. 
Therefore, agents have the following lifetime budget constraint over consumption. 
Given the lifetime budget constraint and utility function of the individual, maximization yields 
the following equations for aggregate labour and capital supply. 
no simulations is this upper bound binding. 
-s 
L (t) = L 
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- s  1 
K' ( t )  = :Lw(t - 1) + 
In the above equation, it is assumed that profits, 
wages, w (t  - 1). 
~ ( t  - l), are re-invested a t  the same ratio as 
Modelling Firms 
Pre-production For each firm, the following steps are taken prior to production. First, each 
firms' "switch gene" is converted into its real number equivalent, q j .  Labour is assigned to  produce 
in the paradigm p j  + 1 according to  the ratio given by q j ,  the rest of the labour available to the firm 
(1 - $,) is assigned to  production in paradigm p,.7 
The degree of correspondence (DC)  is calculat~d for the paradigms in which a firm is producing 
(i  = p,, pl + 1) according to the equation 
a, = 0 if t ,  # f,, a, = 1 if t ,  = f,. (3.6) 
where w, is the weight for the technique z ;  t: and ff denote techniques of TP (the global 
technology set) and F~ (the firm's technology sct) respectively. Thc parameter k denotes the size 
of technology sets relevant for the first paradigm of production. Note that the size of technology 
sets is incrernented for paradigms subsequent to  the first. This increrrieiiting is intended to  capture 
the assumption that higher, more productive technological paradigms are more difficult for firms to 
master.' 
Of each firms' z possible technology sets per relevant paradigm, only that with the highest degree 
of correspondence is used in order to determine the technological level. Others are carried in order 
to  capture firms' technological memory, the importance of which will be clear aftcr a discussion of 
the learning process firms' undergo. 
The technological level of the firm is now computed by an exponential function of the D C  value, 
according to 
where A arid X are free parameters of the model. 
7Note that this is determined prior to the firms' labour market activities. 
8 ~ h e  increasing size of the string representing a firms technology is not a characteristic of the original Ballot and 
Taymaz works. 
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T h e  product ion  funct ion Firm production occurs in each of the two relevant paradigms (pj ,pj + 
1) according to the following equations. 
?,pj+l = ( K j , p j + ~ ) ~ ( A j , p , + l I j r j L j )  B (3.9) 
Total productiori for the firm is sinyly the sum of firm productior~ in the two rclevant paradigms. 
Profit maximization occurs myopically with respect to time. That is, it is assumed that each 
firm maximizes intra-period profits at all points in time. Using parentheses to denote discrete time, 
in each period firms maximize the following profit equation. 
The price of the output is normalized to unity. Therefore, r ( t )  and w(t) denote both nominal 
and real rental and wage rates respectively. 
Aggregate I n p u t  D e m a n d  - Profi t  Maximizat ion For each firm, labour demand is determined 
according to the following unconstrained maximizing demand equation. 
Total capital investment for firm j ,  (Kj,pj + Kj,pj+l = Kj) ,  is determined by the following profit 
maximizing equation. 
Each firm is identical in the production function parameters a and 0. However, firms are het- 
erogeneous in their technological levels (Aj,pj ,AjIpj+l) and switch gene (+j) characteristics. 
For each firm j, we define and calculate the following. 
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Summing total labour and capital demand over all firms, we now have the following aggregate 
demand for each input. 
Input Market Clearing 
U7ages and rental rates are determined through the simultaneous solution to the following two equa- 
tions. 
There is no unemployment in this model. The simultaneous solution to these two equations yields 
market clearing wage and rental rates, ,w* ( t )  and r* ( t ) .  
Production 
Each firm hires a profit maximizing quantity of labour and capital, L:(t)* and ~ , d ( t ) * ,  determined 
by the substituting w*( t )  and r * ( t )  into equations (3.12) and (3.13). Given this profit maximizing 
labour demand, each firm divides its total capital demanded into production in the two relevant 
paradigms according to the following equations. 
A firm's total production and profit are now determined by substituting the optimal labour and 
capital demands into the firm specific production function. 
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Selection 
In every period, N/nl  firms consider alt,ering a key characteristic. This 
of labour between paradigms; their "switch gene". This process is 
described above, a firm undergoes selection only every r ) ~  periods. 
different characteristic is dependent not only on a firm's "fitness", 
considering selection. 
~haracterist~ic is their division 
referred to as selection. As 
The liklihood of selecting a 
but also that of other firms 
Fitness Thc fitness of firms is determined by the weighted slim of historical profits during the 
previous m  periods.g The current period's profit level is included in this history. 
Therefore, fitness for firm j a t  time t is determined by 
where aq refers to the weight placed on each individual element of the summation and .rrj,t refers 
to the profits of firm j in period t .  Note that during selection, firms evaluate the performance of only 
t,hc current fitncss level, based on the preceding 7rr. periods, not the complete history of firm profits. 
Although only a subset of N/m firms consider selection, the fitness value for all firms is calculated 
in every period. Fitness values of all firms are required to enable imitation of technology sets and 
"switch genes". In the first m  periods of the simulation, those firms that are due for selection have 
riot lived a full m  periods. In these periods, fitness is based on the summation over only the number 
of periods they have lived. 
Rank and Selection After the fitness values of all firms are calculated, the fitness values of those 
firms considering selection are ranked. The bottom C#I percent of these firms' will replace their current 
"switch gene".1•‹ This selection procedure is analogous to the ( p ,  A)-selection process described in 
the literature of genetic algorithms. While all firms currently considering selection are eligible to 
alter their "switch gene", those firms under-performing relative to the whole necessarily attempt to 
imitate the characteristic from one of the more successful firms. However, this does not preclude 
other firms considering selection from also ah r ing  their division of labour. This process is modelled 
utilizing an evolutionary algorithm outlined below. 
gNote that  there is no reason these weights need necessarily sum to  1 
' O ~ o t e  that the replacement rate at  this point is constant. However, I will be able to  track the distribution of labor 
between paradigms of those firms falling to  the selection process. That is, the $ j  of bankrupt firms. An alternative 
to  this rather simple selection procedure will be outlined below. 
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Evolut ionary Algor i thm 
Thc simulation now progresses into the "genetic-learning" phasc in which firms attempt to  improve 
their profitability by improving their technological capabilities (technology sets) and their choice 
of relative production between their two relevant technological paradigms ("switch gene"). This is 
accomplished by experimenting with new characteristics, or imitating those of other firms. Imitation 
is not done bli~idly; a firm will only attempt to  copy the characteristics of another if it perceives thc 
comparison firm as more profitable. In each period, every firm attempts to  improve their technological 
capabilitics. However, only firms currently corisideririg selection attempt to  irnprove their division 
of labour ("switch gene"). 
Given a firm is attempting to  imitate another's characteristics, it must first select a firm for 
comparison. The probability of firm j is selected for comparison is equal to that firm's relative 
fitness, computed using the following equation 
Technology s e t s  For each firm, learning within a paradigm is a function of the proportion of 
labour that is devoted to  production within that paradigm; equal to  the real value equivalent of the 
"switch gene", Q j .  A random number is drawn from the uniform distribution over the interval [O,l]. 
This number is compared to the real value eqnivalent of the switch gene of each firm. If the number 
is greater than the gene, learning occurs only in paradigm p j .  If it is less than or equal to the gene, 
a firm's learning occurs only in paradigm pj + l.ll 
Once the paradigm in which learning may take place is determined, a firm is drawn from the set 
of all firms that have capital devoted to  production in this paradigm. The probability of firm j is 
selected for comparison is equal to  that firm's relative fitness to  all other firms with production in 
the paradigm in which learning is to occur.12 We refer to  this fin11 as the comparison firm. 
Thc firm has a choice to either spend time working with its own technology sets, or to look to 
other firms' sets. The firm compares its fitness value to  that of its con~parison firm. If its fitness value 
is higher than that of the comparison firm it works solely with its own technology sets; recombining 
them in an attempt to  increase productive efficiency. If the comparison firm's fitness is higher, the 
firm will attempt to imitate thc con~parison firm. 
Notice that the use of relative fitness is an imperfect signal of the comparison firm's degree of 
correspondence. A comparison firm may have a superior degree of correspondence in the paradigm 
in which learning is to  occur, but a lower relative fitness if, for example, they are producing heavily 
 h his is not to  literally imply that learning may only occur in one paradigm a t  a time; only that ,  over many periods 
thc an~oun t  of lcarning that may take placc in a specific paradigm is a function of the amount of labor devotcd to t,hat 
paradigm 
''Notice that the summation in the above equation will not necessarily be over all N firms 
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in a newer paradigm in which accumulated learning is small. We will assume, however, that this is 
the best signal available to  the firm. This assurnptiori requires that it is very costly to  deterlui~ie the 
actual production practices (other than the relevant paradigm) of another firm with respect to the 
division of labour. Although firms call achieve full information regardiug another firm's productioli 
practices, costs are high enough that they are constrained to knowledge pertaining to only a single 
firm in every period. It selects the rival for colnparisou by comparing relative fitness. 
Recombination. If a firm detcrmines it is to  work with its own technology scts, it selects two 
of the x sets randomly from those specific to  the paradigm it is learning in. I t  selects randomly a 
crossover point for one of the technology sets. A bit is selected as a crossover point with probability 
of l / ( k  + p - 1); each bit is equally likely for selection.13 Each of the technology sets is broken at  
this crossover point, yielding four subsets. One of the subsets for each technology set is switched 
with that of the other, giving two new and distinct technology sets. Next, mutation occurs. Each 
binary bit from the two new technology sets is inverted with probability P r f c .  
The firm now has x + 2 technology sets. These sets are ranked by the magnitude of their degree 
of correspondence, DC. The bottom two sets in this ranking are dropped, leaving once again only 
x sets in the paradigm. This final process replaces an "election operator". 
Imitation. If the firm is attempting to  imitate the production process of the comparison firm, it 
takes the technology set used by the cornparisoll firm in wholc mid adds it t o  the n: sets relevant to  
the paradigm of learning. This set then undergoes mutation. Each bit in the binary string of the 
imitated technology set flips with probability prE:.l4 The x + 1 technology sets are then ranked 
according to their DC,  and the lowest one is dropped, leaving once again x technology sets relevant 
to the paradigm in which learning occurred. 
Importantly, Recombination or Imitation with respect to the t,cchniql~es a firm employs occurs 
before that of the "switch gene" (using last periods switch gene) as they are intended to capture 
learning by doing and imitation in the previous period. 
"Switch Gene" Only firms that underwent selection may alter their "switch gene". This is in 
order to capture the assumption that research, development, and learning is a medium to long-term 
agenda. Firms will not make large decisions in technological focus on an inter-period basis, rather 
they commit m periods to  a new technology in order to  reap payoffs; understanding that there is a 
great deal of experimentation and learning-by-doing that must occur before the potential technology 
becomes productive. 
A firm that is eligible to  alter its switch gene may try something drastic or revolutionary (experi- 
mentation, create a new, totally random switch gene); or try to imitate another firm's; or do nothing. 
1 3 ~ h e  length of these binary strings is k + p - 1 ,  where p is the paradigm in which learning takes place 
'"Mutation may hc interpreted hcre as cither dirccted cxperimcntation on thc part of the firm trying to imitate, or 
as representing an imperfect process of mimicking the comparison firm 
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The probability that it will attempt to imitate another firm's switch gene is equal to PT?. Otherwise, 
with probability (1 - PT?), it raridornly selects a ncw switch gcne. If the firm is under-performing 
relative to others considering selection (i.e., a firm ranked in the bottom 4 percent), it may only 
work with imitation. These firms may not experiment with its switch characteristic; it must imitate 
one of a more successful firm; that is, P r y  = 1. 
Imitation. A firm selects another frorn the whole set of firms for comparison. A firm has a 
probability of being select,cd according to it,s relative fitness value described above. The firm then 
compares its fitness to that of the randomly selected firm. If the fitness of the comparison firm 
is highcr, it imitates the. comparison firm's gene with mutation. That is, it takes their gene in 
whole. Each binary bit of this gene has a probability of mutating (binary switching) equal to PT"~. 
Import,antly, if thc firm being imitated docs not have the samc value for pj ,  the switch characteristic 
being imitated is set to binary null if p, > pi, and unity if p., < pi; where firm i is being imitated 
by firin j. If tlic firm l~eiiig compared lias a lower fitness value, the coinparer docs riot imitate. If 
the relative fitness of the comparison firm is lower than the firm attempting to imitate, nothing is 
done to the imitator's switch gem. If tlic iinitating firm is one that is urider-performing, it does not 
compare fitness values; it simply imitates with mutation the switch characteristic of the comparison 
fir in. 
Experimentation If the firm does not attempt t80 improve via imitation of a more fit firm, it 
experiments with a brand new switch gene. A new switch gene is drawn randomly, with each bit of 
the gene having a probability of 0.5 of taking the value of unity. This has the effect of drawing a 
random dlj from the uniform distribution over [0,1], according to the precision dependent on the size 
of the string representing the gene.15 
Finally, if after altering its switch gene, the real value of this gene does not maintain the minimum 
level of labour investment in the lowest applicable paradigm, p3; i.e. 1 - g j  < m,, the switch 
characteristic is set to zero and the firm specific paradigm parameter, pi, is incremented by one. A 
new set of x technology sets are drawn randomly for the paradigm p, + 2, and those technology sets 
for the paradigm p., are dropped. The firm may now only produce in paradigms p j  + 1 and p., + 2. 
After a firm falls below the minimum investment for a specific paradigm, it can no longer produce 
in that paradigm. It has progressed fully into a newcr paradigm. The firm will ncver producc in the 
older paradigm again, it may only progress to newer ones. This is because if it attempts to imitate 
a more successful firm that is still producing in the older paradigin, it will imitate a switch value of 
zero, limiting its progression into the next paradigm, but never pulling it back into an older one. 
Following the evolutionary learning facet of the simulation, a period ends. The simulation pro- 
gresses by moving into the aggregate input supply stage of the algorithm. 
15Notably, an election operator would not quite fit with such experimentation; since we are swimming in true 
uncertainty. The  idea is that the firm is taking a risk; wagering short run losses against future gains. Any elcction 
operator would be required t o  look inlo thc hlturc; a fulure no firm could predict. 
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Selection - Firm Bankruptcy 
As modcllcd, a fixed and exogenous number of firms undergoing the selection process are forced to 
imitate another's switch gene each period. An alternative specification of the model could entail 
cndowing each firm (at its inception) a given level of cash or wealth. As firms accumulate profits and 
losses, this level of wealth would be adjusted accordingly. A firm would only be forced to imitate 
during selection if, and only if, its level of wealth fell below a given level; most intuitively this level 
would be zero. 
While a bankruptcy criterion for selection has some intuitive characteristics, it lacks a notion of 
relative performance. Firms are not only evaluated with respect to their wealth position, but also 
in their performance with respect to similar firms. A firm with positive net equity that is under- 
performing with respect to other firms is ripe for takeovers and mergers. The selection criterion 
modelled within this work captures this idea well. That said, the equity specification outlined above 
has merit and should be evaluated in future work. 
Furthermore, a sufficient level of selection is necessary for evolutionary algorithms to perform in 
a satisfactory manner. The selection process outlined within the model above maintains a level of 
selection regardless of absolute performance. Allowing selection to be based on absolute performance 
may not invoke sufficient selective pressure required for the efficacy of the learning algorithm. 
3.5 Simulation Results 
We begin with consideration of a single parameterization of the model referred to as the reference 
simulations (Simulation 1). The parameter choices for these reference simulations are contained in 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. Using the reference simulations' learning parameters specified in Table 3.2, 
the remaining free parameters contained in Table 3.3 are selected in a manner that yields results 
approximating U S .  quarterly growth rates. As there is no empirical basis for the choice of the mini- 
mum labour requirements appropriate for each paradigm (m j ) ,  the reference simulations' parameters 
are utilized over thirty dist,inct and mndomly chosen specifications of minimum investment.16 All 
simulations occur over 500 periods, or 125 years. 
In order to facilitate a con~parison with actual economic data, in Table 3.1 we present summary 
statistics of a sub-sample of the entire simulations' duration. This sub-sample contains only the 
first 190 quarters ill order to limit the time frame to that of available data. Table 3.1 presents a 
summary of the average quarterly growth rate in real income per capita and the ratio of quarters 
in which this growth is negative. These figures represent averages over the entire set of randomly 
chosen specifications for the minimum labour requirements appropriate for each paradigm. Average 
l6while each simulation shares an identical process of random number generation, a unique initial seed value for 
this process is choscrl for each in  order to  cnsiire results arc robust t o  different sequences of random numbers. 
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standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The standard deviation of measures across each 
simulation are presented in italics. The reference simulations (Simulation 1) are characterized by 
an average quarterly growth rate of 0.5814 percent; only 0.0312 percent higher than that of the 
U.S. data (Simulation 0).17 Of course, as mentioned above, given the reference simulations' learning 
parameters (Table 3.2), other simulation parameters have been selected such that the quarterly 
growth rate matches the data well. Although the quarterly growth rate is very similar to that 
observed in actual data, the ratio of quarters in which negative growth occurs is somewhat lower; 
9.96 percent versus 22.53. Although periods of negative growth are a characteristic of the reference 
simulations, they occur with less frequency than observed in actual U.S. data. 
Growth statistics over simulations' entire duration are presented in Table 3.5. Presented in Table 
3.6 are the growth statistics for average paradigm.18 We emphasize that this table represents rates 
of growth in average paradigm, not absolute changes. Table 3.7 contains statistics summarizing 
the ratio of periods with negative output growth to those in which output growth is non-negative. 
Again, these figures represent average values across the randomly determined specifications for the 
minimum labour requirements identical to those appropriate to Table 3.1. 
An important feature of these reference simulations is that despite firms' ability to adopt new 
technologies incrementally, periods of negative growth occur. While the average rate of growth over 
the entire time series equals 1.07 percent, in 13.07 percent of simulative periods negative growth to 
total output occurs (See Tables 3.5 and 3.7, respectively). 
The results of a single simulation of the reference parameters are contained in Figures 3.1 through 
3.3. The minimum labour requirements for this single simulation are presented in Table 3.4. Figure 
3.1 contains a plot of the per period growth rate in total production. As there is no growth rate in 
the population or change in the price level, this figure also represents real per period growth rates 
per capita. The time series for the log of total production is presented in Figure 3.2 and the average 
paradigm of production is presented in Figure 3.3. 
There is a decisive co-movement between aggregate output growth and transition towards newer 
technological paradigms. The transition towards adopting new technologies is gradual. This high- 
lights the important implications of learning-by-doing and inter-firm imitation in the process of 
technological appropriation, as discussed above. 
Periods preceding adoption are characterized by low levels of output growth; in some scenarios 
these low levels of growth border on stagnate. Here, we define periods of stagnate growth as those 
characterized by low levels of aggregate output growth, in absolute terms. Additionally, these are 
periods in which positive levels of growth appear as often as negative and in equal magnitude on 
average. Periods of stagnate growth yield no significant trend in aggregate output. 
1 7 ~ e a l  income per capita da ta  is calculated utilizing population and real gross domestic product figures from the 
U.S. department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
lsTo calculate the average paradigm of production, we utilize the  lower of the  two relevant paradigms for the firm. 
As production may occur in the lower and upper relevant paradigms, this measure will be negatively biased 
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Figure 3.1: Growth Rate in Total Production Per-Capita. 
Figure 3.2: Log of Total Per-Capita Production. 
CHAPTER 3. ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Figure 3.3: Average Paradigm. 
Importantly, prolonged growth stagnation occurs in scenarios where a newer, more productive 
paradigm requires a high level of labour devotcd to it in order to makc it available to a firm. Noticc 
that the stagnation in growth in the log of total output that occurs between the simulative periods 300 
and 350 is associated with a similar stagnation in the level of average paradigm (Figure 3.3). In Table 
3.4, the minimum labour requirements for each paradigm are presented. The stagnation in paradigm 
growth occurs around the sixth paradigm. For availability of the next paradigm, firms must devote 
49.46 percent of it's labour's time to production in it.19 The relatively high requirement makes it 
very difficlllt for firms t,o enter into production in this paradigm. High minimum requirements (mj) 
have two important growth effects. First, they make entering into production utilizing the technology 
associatcd with high rninirnun~ labour rcquirerncnt difficult. As mentioned, this may cause stagriati011 
in growth as transition into this technology occurs very slowly. However, technologies with high 
rrlir~irriurrl rcquiremerits arc easier for firills to abandon. As such, transition out of this technology and 
into its successor is more likely to occur, having a positive impact on growth. Therein, the transition 
between technologies required for long run growth in per capita incomes will be dependent not only 
on the minimum labour requirement of the successive technology, rnjil, but also on its predecessor, 
"j. 
An important question remains. Are these negative growth periods a result of negative shocks to 
productivity? In order to answer this, consider the model simulated without the ability of paradigm 
progression. That is, each firm's value of 11, is set at zero and does not undergo any changes. 
l g ~ h e  upper bound on these requirements, mi, is 50 percent 
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Furthermore, the degree of correspondence is not dynamic. Regardless of the parameterization, it 
should be clear that wages will instantaneously adjust, unemployment will settle a t  a level of zero, 
capital stocks and interest rates will remain constant and no growth will occur. Now, if we add 
the ability for firrns to increase their labour devoted to  the subsequent paradigm ($) and maintain 
that the technological level of the firm in the following paradigm (Aj,p,+l) is greater than the latter 
(Ajlp3), the overall productivity of the firm increases, both labour and capital demand increase, and 
there is no possibility for total output to decrease. The only fundamental cause of negative shocks 
t,o economic growth available in this model is through negative productivity shocks a t  the firm level. 
A firm progressing into a paradigm that it is less proficient in will observe an overall productivity 
decline, a decline in its demand for labour and capital, and its output will decline. Of course, the fall 
in labour demand will put downward pressure on wages, therein dampening this immediate effect. 
Essentially, there are no exogenous shocks or effects inherent in the labour or capital market that 
may give rise to  negative economic growth. Effects observed in these markets must be in response 
to productivity fundamentals. 
3.5.1 Genetic Parameter Effects 
The genetic parameters specific to the model may have important effects on the dynamics of the 
simulation that are unintuitive. As such, the model is simulated with 11 different permutations of 
parameter choices over the reference simulations. These permutations include parameter variation 
over the probability of bit mutation given a firm is recombining their technology sets (Pr:;), 
variation over the probability of bit mutation given a firm is imitating another's technology sets 
(~r:;), variation over the probability a firm will imitate another's switch gene (pry), and variation 
over the likelihood of mutation given the firm is imitating another's switch gene (~ r ; , , ) .  The 
parameter choices for each of these variables is given in Table 3.2. All other simulation parameters 
are identical to  those utilized in the reference simulations. Importantly, each simulation shares an  
identical set of minimum labour investment requirements for each paradigm and an identical process 
of random number generation. The results of these simulations are contained in Table 3.1 (sub- 
sample) and Tables 3.5 through 3.7 (entire simulation). Importantly, in every permutation of the 
genetic parameters, regardless of the resulting average rate of growth, each simulation is afflicted 
with periods of negative growth in total output (See Table 3.7). 
Variation in the genetic parameters results in important variation in the level of growth in real 
output per capita. Over the entire simulations' sample, against the reference simulations with an 
average quarterly growth rate of 1.07 percent, permutations yield a maximum average growth rate 
of 5.13 percent (simulation number 7). Over the sub-sample comparable to  U.S. data  presented in 
Table 3.1, all permutations over the learning parameters yield simulations with average quarterly 
growth rates within a single standard deviation of empirical observations. However, in none of these 
simulations is the ratio of periods characterized by negative growth similar to that of the data. In 
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Simulation No. Average Growth Ratio Negative 
Table 3.1: Simulation Sub-Sample versus Real World Data 
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simulation 8, although this ratio increases from that of the reference (from 9.96 to 16.75), it continues 
to fall short of that observed in actual data (22.53). 
With respect to the baseline simulation, there are some notable effects derived from changes in 
these genetic parameters. First, increasing the probability of mutation given a firm is imitating 
another's switch gene (PT.:~~) appears to increase the level of growth (simulations 2 through 4). 
From the baseline value of 0.05, decreasing this rate to 0.025 also decreases the average rate of 
quarterly growth from 1.07 to 1.02. Increasing this parameter to 0.10 and 0.15 has positive impacts 
on the overall level of average aggregate growth, increasing it from 1.07 to 1.49 and 2.07, respectively. 
Wc conclude that there is a positive relation betwecn the probability of mutation given the firm is 
imitating another's switch gene and average growth. 
There is intuition behind this result. Remember, in every period a given number of firms have 
the ability to alter their switch genes, and choose to imitate another firm's gene with a probability 
determined by PI*!. In fact, of these with the potential to alter this gene, those that fail the selection 
process must alter their gene through imitation. There are two effects mutation has with respect to 
this imitation. 
First, the firm is more likely to imitate firms that are very successful. As such, ~nutatiorl is a 
terrible process that destroys the attempt to mimic the successful firm. Increasing mutation leaves 
thcse firms with labour divisions that arc not as productivc in the short run. This causes decreases 
in average growth rates. 
However, increasing this mutation rate also has the effect of pushing more and more firms into 
the newer technological paradigm even when it is less productive. It forces these firms to begin 
building a competence in the new technology even before it is profitable to do so. The more firms 
that are pushed into this new paradigm, the faster will incremental innovations occur, as firms may 
take advantage of imitation. While these firms will perform terribly with respect to other firms 
that choose not to produce in this paradigm, their competence is available for imitation once these 
firms do progress. In the long run, the ability to imitate this competence has the effect of increasing 
growth rates. 
Although the first of these affects will decrease growth rates in the short run, when considering 
average growth rates over a long horizon, the second affect dominates. 
Decreases in the probability of imitating another's switch gene, (Pr! ) ,  greatly increases the 
overall growth of the economy (simulations 5 through 7). I t  is the strongest of the genetic parameter 
affects discussed in this section. The intuition behind this effect is exactly the same as that behind 
the long run effect of increasing the size of the PI:, parameter. Forcing firms to experiment with 
new switch genes has the effect of pushing a greater nurnber of firms towards adopting the new 
technology, regardless of the productivity of that new technology. While these firms suffer low levels 
of productivity, they build a compctencc in the paradigm that may be imitated by other firms in 
the future. The more firms that experiment with this new technology, the faster the level of this 
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competence can increase through social learning. 
Although not simulated, we would expect that further decreases in the probability of imitating 
another firm's switch gene would eventually lead to d~creases in the avenge level of economic growth. 
This stems from the fact that too many firms would be progressing into new technological paradigms 
for the economy to ever achieve competency in any one of them. Although the economy would 
progress into more potentially productive technological paradigms, it would never spend enough time 
in any particular paradigm to achieve a level of competence that enabled capturing the potential 
productivity of the technology it uses at any given point in time. 
Similar to the positive relation between the probability of mutation given the firm is imitating 
another's switch gene, it appears that increases in the probability of mutation given imitation of 
another's technology (~r::) has positive impacts on average levels of quarterly growth. For the 
parameter values simulated (0.05, 0.10, 0.10 and 0.15), average growth increases directly with larger 
values of mutation (1.04, 1.07, 1.28 and 1.47, respectively). Although mutation decreases the ability 
of firms to imitate the technologies of more profitable firms, it appears that the negative impacts 
on growth this effect has is outweighed by the benefits stemming from the increases in diversity 
associated with high rates of mutation over technologies. Interestingly, this relationship does not hold 
with respect to mutation when a firm is recombining it's own technology sets. Here, a convex relation 
between Pr!$ and growth rates exists, where growth is maximized at  the reference simulations' 
parameterization of mutation. However, the strength of this relationship is weak. Although both 
increases and decreases in this parameter yield a fall in average growth, their magnitude is smaller 
than any other learning parameter effect. 
These results allow for the interpretation of economies characterized by extended periods of 
stagnate growth in terms of the model considered within this work. Differences in growth are 
assumed to be the sole result of diflerences ill the pace of technological appropriation. Two things 
are required for appropriation, experimentation within the new technology and imitation of firms that 
find success within this technology. If an economy is not fostered by an environment conducive to 
either of these two effects, transition t,hrough technologies occurs a t  a slower rate, and growth in per 
capita income is lower than that of other economies. If the conditions relevant for experimentation 
and imitation in an economy suffering from such effects are altered, growth within the economy will 
increase, correlated with an increase in the pace of technological appropriation. 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
The model examined in this work allows for the investigation of the sufficiency of learning-by-doing 
for explaining negative macroeconomic output shocks in an evolutionary model of technological 
transition. It has been argued that the productivity gap between old and new technologies causes 
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temporary negative aggregate output shocks despite the ability of firms to adopt these new tech- 
nologies in a non-discrete manner. The productivity gap between old and new technologies results 
from the lack of accrued incremental innovations in the newer technologies. These results appear 
highly robust with respect to changes in the underlying parameters of the evolutionary algorithm 
of firm adaptation. While periods of negative growth in real output per capita are a regularity of 
the simulations, they occur with less frequency than found in actual U.S. data. The framework 
outlined within this work has important advantages over other models in the literature in that it 
offers a natural model of experimentation by agents and allows consistency with Nelson and Winter's 
(1982) interpretation of Schumpetarian competition. The manner in which innovation and techno- 
logical progression is modelled within this work is also consistent with key observations of significant 
technological transitions of the past; specifically, the Industrial Revolution. 
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3.7 Appendix 
Simulation No. Pr!$ P,rDC rnli PI PT: 
-- - - 
Table 3.2: Genetic Parameter Specification 
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T - Simulation Periods 
N - Number of Firms 
LI - Total Initial Population 
nl - Growth Rate in Population 
KO - Initial Capital Supply 
b - Depreciation Rate of Capital 
x - Technology sets per Paradigm 3 
k - Bit Length of First Paradigm's Technology Sets 18 
I, - Bit Length of Switch Gene 8 
rn - Number of Periods Used in Fitness Calculation 10 
4 - Percent of New Firms From Those Under Selection 0.20 
X - Parameter in Equation Linking DC to Aj,i 1.15 
A - Parameter in Equation Linking DC to Aj:i 1 
cr - Capital's Share of Output 0.33 
p - Labour's Share of Output 0.60 
Table 3.3: Baseline Parameter Specification 
Paradigm ( j )  Minimum Labour Investment (m i )  
Table 3.4: Minimum Labour Investment 
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Simulation 10-500 10-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 
Table 3.5: Average Aggregate Growth Rate 
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Simulation 10-500 10-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 
Table 3.6: Average Paradigm Growth Rate 
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Simulation 10-500 10-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 
Table 3.7: Ratio of Periods with Negative Growth Rate 
Chapter 4 
The Muth Model 
Intelligent Mutation Rate Control in an Economic Application of Ge- 
netic Algorithms 
4.1 Introduction 
Genetic Algorithms are the best known representation of a class of direct random search methods 
called evolutionary algorithms which are widely used to solve complex optimization and adaptation 
problems. Their use within economics is grounded on their ability to represent the adaptation of 
individuals to  the underlying parameters of their economic environment. They facilitate a departure 
from the rational expectations hypothesis, which requires in it's place a model of learning employed 
in order to describe the manner in which agents make decisions about their economic behavior. 
Gcnetic algorithms describe thc evoliit~ion of a population of rules, representing diffcrent possible 
beliefs, in response to experience. A population of n individual rules are represented by binary 
vectors, :ci = ( x i ,  xi, ..., 2: ; )  E (0, l)k, of fixcd length k. This population of rules may represent 
different agents interacting, referred to as social learning, or a single agent's mutually competing 
ideas, referred to  as individual learning. In each of these representations, the frequency with which a 
given rule is represented in the population indicates the degree to  which it is accepted in a population 
of agents, or the degree of credence attached to it, respectively. The success of a particular rule is 
referred to as it's fitness and is determined according to a specific fitness function. Rules whose 
application has been more successful are more likely to  become represented in the population. This 
occurs according to a classical probabilistic proportional selection operator that uses the relative 
fitness to  serve as selcctiori probability. 
Heterogeneity is introduced into the population through two evolutionary operators, crossover 
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and mutation. The crossover operator works by first randomly assigning each rule in the population 
to a pair. For each pair, the crossover operator cxcl~anges inforrnation between different individual 
rules with a given probability, p,. 
This paper focuses on the mutation operator, which introduces innovation into the population by 
inverting bits of the binary vectors. Each bit has a small and independent probability of inversion, 
p,,. This operator is typically assessed as a secondary one which is of little importance in com- 
parison to crossover. Most applications of genetic algorithms work with small, constant settings of 
p, E [0.001,0.01]. While there are logical and mathematical bounds on the choice of the magnitude 
of p,, it remains a free parameter of the algorithms implementation. 
In a simple, non-economic directed search implementation of genetic algorithms, the choice of 
the mutation rate is of concern in a very practical sense. Many applications favor larger or non- 
constant (though deterministic) settings of the mutation rate for increasing the speed at which the 
algorithm converges on the solution. This practical importance is also a concern for implementation 
in econon~ic settings. 
In an economic system of constant change, there is likely a requirement for constant introduction 
of innovation. It is likely, however, that there is an optimal rate a t  which this innovation occurs and 
that it is dependent on the underlying stochastic nature of the system in question. More dynamic, 
or stochastic, environments may call for a higher level of maintained experimentation. Importantly, 
this rate of experimentation is likely linked to the economic system and not an exogenous parameter 
of human learning. 
In addition, genetic algorithms are used in comparison to an actual human learning process.1 
In these settings, fixing the rate of mutation may be problematic for other, non-practical reasons. 
If bit,wise mut,ation is to  be analogous to some actual human learning operator, fixing the rate of 
this action seems inappropriate, a priori. Learning agents are likely to  adapt the rate with which 
they experiment with new rules as the perceived benefit of this experimentation decreases. Modelling 
economic choices using a genetic algorithm with a fixed mutation rate may introduce a biased amount 
of innovation over the population of rules. 
Ex post, this bias precludes the use of fixed mutation rates for reasons of parsimony. The use 
of fixed mutation rates allows for constant introduction of innovation over a population of rules 
and therefore the ability to adapt to  an economic environment. However, in many cases, fixed 
mutation rates preclude the system's true convergence to an economic equilibrium. Even as the 
system converges to  equilibrium levels, the rate at  which individuals experiment remains the same. 
When compared to actual human behavior, this outcome is problematic. If the system is to converge, 
mutation rates must fall to  zero or an election operator must be used. 
The use of an election operator limits the introduction of innovation to situations in which the 
rnutated rule is associated with an "expected" increase in fitness (Arifovic, 1994). After the crossover 
' ~ x a r n ~ l e s  of such work include Arifovic and Ledyard (2004), and Arifovic and Maschek (2004) 
CHAPTER 4 .  T H E  MUTH MODEL 
and mutation operators have generated potential new rules, the election operator tests these rules 
beforc they are permitted to becorric rnerribcrs of the population. The fitness that each new rule 
would have attained is determined, holding all variables relevant for the calculation fixed at the 
previous period's values. This value is referred to as potential fitness. The potential fitness of the 
new rules is compared to the actual fitness associated with the rule's parents (parents are the pairs 
of rules that are used in the application of the crossover operator). A new rule may only replace a 
parent rule if it's potential fitness is higher than that of a parent's actual fitness. 
The economic use of genetic algorithms is becoming popular for their possible representation 
of a learning process. The use of an election operator is analogous to the acceptance of "simple" 
expectations, and may not capture actual human behavior in a satisfactory manner. If multiple 
equilibria exist, switching between these equilibria is an impossibility with the adoption of the 
election operator in genetic algorithm models of agent behavior. The election operator's efficacy 
is grounded on the control of innovation over rules in the population. The introduction of innovation 
is achieved through the crossover and mutation operators. A more realistic control of the introduction 
of innovation over the population may be found in the control of these operators directly, rather than 
the adoption of simple expectations. 
This work acknowledges the importance of the introduction of innovation, but maintains the level 
with which innovation is introduced should be determined within the framework of the rnodel rather 
than being exogenously imposed or limited through the use of simple expectations. Herein, the focus 
is limited to the mutation operator. An alternative mechanism for controlling mutation lies in the 
on-l ine  learning, or self-adaptation of this parameter. We consider this mechanism below in Section 
4.4. We wish to consider how this mechanism affects an economic application of genetic algorithms 
in terms of variation in aggregate outcomes and convergence. With respect to the latter, we will 
examine the potential for self-adaptation to replace the election opcrator as sufficient for yielding 
convergent results. The economic environment in which we consider these questions is presented 
in Section 4.2, and the application of genetic algorithm adaption in this environment without self- 
adaptation is presented in Section 4.3. Results of the analysis are presented in Section 4.5, and 
conclusions follow. 
4.2 Proposed Environment for Analysis 
We wish to  compare the performance of simple genetic algorithms to ones in which the election op- 
erator is included and those characterized by self-adaptation in an economic setting, or environment. 
The cobweb environment examined by Arifovic (1994) is proposed for the analysis.' Its choice is 
 he rational expectations version of the model has been considered in the work of Muth (1961). Versions of 
the model with alternative formulations of learning have been presented in the works of Nerlove (1958), Carlson 
(1969), Townsend (1978), DeCanio (1979), Frydman (1981), Brandenburger (1984), Bray and Savin (1986), Marcet 
and Sargent (1987), and Nyarko (1990). The model has been simulated in an  experimental setting by Holt and 
Williamil (1986) and Welford (1989). While divergent behavior characterizes most of the above algorithms in the 
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motivated by the following considerations. First, it is a simple environment that lends itself well 
for comparing results of a simple genetic approach, an extended approach including the election 
operator, and the approach of this work (inclusion of self-adaptation). Additionally, the cobweb 
model is easily adapted to one of constant change. Though considered constant in this work, the 
underlying parameters of the model which determine the rational expectations solution could easily 
change according to  some Markov-switching process, or encompass stochastic exogenous shocks. 
In the work of Arifovic, a genetic algorithm is nscd to update the firms' decision rules determining 
production in the following period. Her results show that genetic algorithms in this setting are 
characterized by convergence to the rational-expectations equilibrium for a much wider range of 
parameter values than other algorithms. 
4.2.1 Description of the cobweb model 
The model contains n firms in a competitive market. Firms produce the same good and each is a 
price taker. Each firm has an idcntiral cost function givcn by 
where Ci,t is firm i's cost of production for sale at time t and quantity qi.t. Since the production of 
goods takes time, quantities produced must be decided before a market price is observed. Expected 
profit of an individual firm, ll;,,, is 
where Pf is the expected price of the good at time t .  Each firm chooses a quantity q,,l to maximize 
its expected profit II;,, on the basis of its expectations regarding the prevailing price P,'. The first 
order condition for profit maximization with respect to qi,l is given by the following equation 
where the price Pt that clears the market at time t is determined by the demand curve 
The rational expectations equilibrium is characterized by Pf = Pt and qt,i = qt for all i. By 
rearranging equation x ,  this may be expressed as 
unstable case, this was not observed in the experimental settings with human subjects. 
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Solving the above expression we arrive at the following characterization of the rational expecta- 
tions equilibrium per firm quantity 
A key objective of the Arifovic (1994) work is to determine whether quantities produced by firms 
that are using a genetic algorithm as their learning scheme will converge to  this constant rational 
expectations quantity and how these results compare to the results of other learning and experimental 
behavior (See Arifovic (1994) pp.07). Her application of the genetic algorithm to the above economic 
framework is described in the proceeding sub-section. 
4.3 Application of the basic genetic learning algorithm 
A population of binary strings, At, represents a collection of firms' decision rules at time period t .  
These binary strings are of fixed length, k, written over the {0,1} alphabet. These strings are decoded 
into their integer equivalent and normalized in order to give their production level equivalent. For a 
string i of length k the decoding works in the following manner: 
where a:,, is the value (0,l) taken at the j t h  position in the string. 
After a string is decoded, its integer value is normalized in order to obtain a real number value 
4i,t that represents production levels a t  time t for firm i :  
qi,t = x i , t / Z  
where K is the normalizing coefficient. 
Fitness of a rule i at time t ,  pi , l ,  is determined by the value of firms' profit earned in the period. 
Firms' decision rules are updated using three genetic operators: reproduction, crossover, and 
mutation. Reproduction makes the copies of individual chromosomes according to their relative 
fitness. The probability that a chromosome will get a copy Ci,t is given by 
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In every period, n rules are created from the pool of rules utilized in the preceding period. The 
algorithmic form of the reproduction operator is like a biased roulette wheel where each string is 
allocated a slot sized in proportion to its relative fitness. Thus, rules with a higher fitness value in 
the preceding period having a higher probability of existing in the subsequent period (or existing 
in higher numbers). These copies represent the pool of rules which then undergoes crossover and 
mutation. 
Crossover exchanges the parts of pairs of randomly selected strings. It operates in two stages. 
First, two strings are drawn from the pool of copies a t  random. Then, a random integer is drawn, 
0 E [I, k - 11. Two new strings are formed by swapping the set of binary values to the right of the 
position b. In each of the n/2 randomly determined pairs, this crossover occurs with probability p,. 
Mutation is the process of a random change in the value of a position within a string. Each 
position has a probability, p,, of being altered by mutation, independent of other positions. 
After the members of the new population are determined, the quantity that will be produced 
and offered for salc at tirnc t is corr~puted for each firm. Ir~dividual quantities are surrirned up a r~d  
the market price, PL, is determined. Next, costs associated with each firm's production level are 
calculated and cach firrrl's fitricss level is then dcterrnincd. 
The above described steps are applied iteratively for T generations. The population of chromo- 
somes a t  time period 0 is randomly determined. 
4.4 Two-Level Learning in Genetic Algorithms 
The self-adaptation principle incorporates certain strategy parameters into the representation of each 
individual. The strategy parameter set of an individual provides a parameter setting for mutation 
when applied to this particular individual, and strategy parameters evolve by means of mutation 
(and recombination) just as the object variables do. 
The genealogy of on-line learning may be traced to its origins in the work of Schwefel in the 
context of multimembered evolution strategies (1987, 1992, 1995). Independently of this, Fogel et 
al. (1991) developed an almost identical procedure for evolutionary programming.3 
The specific introductiori of self-adaptation considered herc has been proposed a r~d  tested in 
specific environments by Back and Schiitz. They propose a self-adaptive mechanism of a single 
rnutatiori ratc per individual sudi that the following requirements are fulfilled: 
3See also Fogel (1995). 
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(1) Mutation of the mutation rate p,,, E ] O , 1 [  yields a mutation rate pi, E ]0,1[. 
(2) The expected change of p,, by repeatedly mutating it equals zero. That is, E[pk,] = p,,. 
(3) Small changes are more likely than large ones. 
(4) A modification by a factor c occurs with the same probability as a modification by l lc.  
The first requirement simply maintains that after mutation, the new individual mutation rate 
remains in the mathematical bounds appropriate. Requiring that repeated mutations yield an ex- 
pected change equal to zero is done to ensure that the only force driving the direction of these 
mutations is selection. There is to be no drift in mutation rates not associated with higher levels 
of fitness. The final two requirements give structure to the distribution of changes in the individual 
mutation rates. The distribution of potential changes to p,, is positively skewed (according to the 
fourth requirement) making a given factor increase in the mutation rate more likely than a decrease 
of equal factor. 
Based on these requirements, a logistic transformation of the form 
such that pA is distributed according to a logistic normal distribution with the given probability 
density function 
where C = ln-. We refer to pk as the mutated mutation rate. The learning rate, y, allows for a 1 -P", 
control of the adaptation speed evolutionary strategies' mutation rate. For a given rate of mutation, 
p,, the variance over the mutated mutation rates, pi,, increases for higher values of the rate of 
learning, y. As such, more heterogeneity over individual mutation rates is introduced in each period. 
The algorithms works as follows. The genotype of an individual consists of a bitstring of length 
k and an individual mutation rate p:,, that controls the bitwise mutation of (xi ,  x:, ..., x;) according 
to the mutated mutation rate pL. 
The mutation process yields a new individual zi' = ( 2 { ,  z$, ..., ~ : , ~ k ) .  Crossover is applied only 
to the binary vector and has no impact on the mutation rate, but this is certainly an area of future 
research. This algorithms allows for incorporation and exclusion of the election operator. 
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111 their original application of the algorithm, Back and Schutz use the counting-ones problem, 
k 
,f (z) = xi=l n:i --t m.in., to  build a rmdified corltirluous optimizatiorl problern in which switching 
occurs every 250 periods between f and fl(x) = k - f (x) --t m.in. A "cycle" is referred to  as the 
period between switches of the optimization problem. Their results show that during a given cycle 
of the optimization problem, mutation rates decrease drastically from values close to 0.1 to near 
their lower bound. Within only a few generations of the switching, mutation rates increase back to 
this higher value. Convergence velocity increases, driving an improvement in the objective function 
value over simulations in which self-adaptation was not i n ~ l u d e d . ~  
4.4.1 Selective pressure 
Mutation Rates 
As emphasized by Back and Schiitz, self adaptation works by means of the selective advantage or 
disadvantage of mutation rates. This advantage is expressed by its impact on the fitness function of 
the rule it is associated with. Back and Schiitz argue that the self-adaptation mechanism can only 
work effectively if a t  least one bit per binary string is mutated on average. As such, they impose a 
lower bound on the rate of mutation, p,, that is equal to ilk. 
- 
This argument is particularly sound with respect to convergence velocity, especially in the 
counting-ones framework in which they are working. Here, the problem is altered every 250 periods; 
the population of rules must adapt to  a new solution every 250 periods. Maintaining a sufficient 
level of mutation is required in order to allow sufficient diversity so as to  converge on an alternative 
solution. With respect to velocity of convergence, if self adaptation is to  outperform algorithms with 
constant mutation rates in their environment, this lower bound of 1/k is required.5. 
In the framework considered herein, the parameterization of the model for which these rules 
are required to  adapt to  is held constant over the duration of the simulation. Maintaining a level 
of diversity as high as l/k may not be required for the self adaptation mechanism to work effec- 
tively. Additionally, many economic works utilizing the genetic algorithm have enjoyed success with 
mutation rates lower than that required for average mutation of one bit per binary string. 
Regardless, if given a sufficient duration of simulative periods, selection of better performing rules 
with respect t,o fitncss will occur, cven if the rate of mutation is lower than Ilk. As the environment 
within which these rules are functioning is non-changing, even slight selective pressure will allow 
convergence to rules that will, over the long run, outperform the average. 
4 ~ h i l e  under optimal circumstances the modified problem requires oscillating behavior of the mutation rate, the 
problem does not contain complementarity between rules with respect t o  their fitness; a characteristic of most economic 
environmcnts. This work is t,he first examination of the pcrforrnance of sclf adaptation in an environment in which a 
rule's fitness is also a fimction of the other 71. - 1 rules. 
51t will be argued that even in such a framework, placing a lower bound on the rate of mutation is not strictly 
required if one incorporates f i tness dependent  m u t a t i o n  rr~odi f icatom (see below) 
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We therefore incorporate a lower bound on mutation, p,, but include values that are less than 
- 
l /k .  If lower bound values around l / k  are required for eflcctive self adaptation in this particular 
environment, then simulation results with lower values will provide evidence supporting such. We 
emphasize that this may not be appropriate in frameworks with model parameters that are changing 
over some period within the simulation. 
Selection 
For the self adaptation principle to work, Schwefel (1987, 1992) has demonstrated that a relatively 
strong selective pressure, such as that provided by (p, A)-selection, is required.6 As such, Back and 
Schiitz utilize simulations incorporating both proportional selection (that which is used within this 
work) and the stronger (p, A)-selection process. 
In their work, Back and Schutz conclude that the only difference between proportional and (p, A)- 
selection consists in the fact that smaller selective pressure of proportional selection allows for a larger 
diversity of the mutation rates and implies a slightly slower convergence velocity. 
In this work, as in the original Arifovic (1994) work, we utilize proportional selection. However, 
in order to increase the selective pressure slightly, we alter the determination of rules' fitness from 
the original. Herc, we apply a monotonic trarlsforrnatiorl to the rules' profit in order to calculate its 
fitness. 
In the above equation, denotes the effective fitness of individual rule i in period t.  The 
rr~axirnal aud rninirrlal fitness value in thc population at the current generation are denoted by pmaz 
and P,~,,,, respectively. The conversion simply rescales the fitness values to the [0,1] interval. 
The conversion to effective fitness has the effect of allowing for diverse fitness values even when 
the absolutc, or raw, fitness levcls of the rules are quite close together. This is likcly to occur when a 
simulation approaches convergence to the economic equilibrium of competitive output. This has the 
effect of favoring replication of rnlcs that perform bettcr in terms of profits, even if the improvements 
in profits are slight in absolute, or raw terms. In order to evaluate the effect of this increase in selective 
pressure, simulations will be run with, and without thc effective fitness modification inherent in the 
above equation. 
The above formulation of effective fitness allows an extension of the algorithm in which alterations 
of individual mutation rates beyond a global rate are associated with an energy cost to fitness. 
6 ~ h i s  selection functions according to  p parent individuals creating X > p offspring by rccombination and mutation. 
Only the best /L offspring individuals arc selected as parents for the next generation 
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4.4.2 Fitness dependent mutation modificators 
In an extension to the evolutionary algorithm described above, we assume that changes in individual 
mutation rates may not occur without cost. In a genetic model of plant evolution, Kim (1998) 
extends the basic modelling concept in a manner that includes an energy cost of mutation rate 
adaptation. This energy cost manifests within the rules' fitness function and is dependent on the 
rules' individual rr~utatio~n modijicuto,r. Hcrein, the adoption of Kim's mutation rnodificator allows 
for a link between mutation rate adaptations and fitness penalties. 
An individual rule's mutation modificator is an implicit function of it's particular mutation rate: 
In the above equation, pilt denotes the individual mutation rate of rule i in generation t .  The 
mutation modificator, ni,t, is a characteristic of each individual rule that is linked to its particular 
mutation rate by the parameters m and q, referred to as the global mutation rate and the mutation 
rate modijicator factor, respectively. 
Solving for ni yields the following equation: 
Thc mutation rnodificator is a positive function of the percent difference between thc individual 
and the global mutation rate. The fitness cost associated with per unit changes in the absolute value 
of the mutation modificator is determined by the parameter p in the following alternative cf•’ective 
fitness equation. 
~ , e  f f = Pi,t - Pmin 
r , l  - pI~i , t I  Pmax - Pmin 
Assuming q is greater than one, the effective cost of mutation rate deviations from the global 
rate is determined by the size of p/ ln(q). 
Fe f f  = Pi,t - Pmin P 
z , t  - -1 l n ( ~ i , t )  - ln(m)l 
m a  - n ln(rl) 
The rescaling of raw profit levels into effective fitness, F;jf, allows for application of the penalty, 
p, that is independent of the absolute raw fitness levels. Setting the mutation rate modification 
penalty to zero permits accordance with the genetic algorithm described in previous sections. 
There exists an economic interpretation for total fitness costs that result when individual mutation 
dcviates from the global rate. Total fitness penalties are the result of two qualitatively distinct costs 
associated with different levels of individual mutation. 
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First, reductions in mutation rates are likely associated with increased effort costs as they would 
require avoiding trembling hand perturbations of the binary encoded rule. Such costs would be a 
decreasing function of the individual mutation rate. That is, such costs can be avoided by adopting 
higher levels for the likelihood of mutation. 
However, adaptation of higher mutation rates requires concerted effort on the part of the indi- 
vidual to continually search out new rules for adoption. Additionally, these larger mutation rates 
increase in frequency in which new rules are adopted and are therefore associated with relatively 
higher effort costs. This second effort cost is an increasing function of the individual mutation rate. 
The addition of these two qualitative costs yields the total fitness cost associated with a particular 
level of mutation. At the global mutation rate, these costs are minimized and equal zero. The 
absolute value of the effort cost a t  the global mutation rate is not important as only relative fitness 
determines evolutionary dynamics. The only important characteristic of the global mutation rate is 
that a t  this value fitness costs associated with mutation are minimized. 
4.5 Simulation Results 
4.5.1 Replicating the Arifovic (1994) Results 
We begin by simulating the original algorithm specified by Arifovic (1994) in order to hold it as a 
benchmark for the alternative of adaptive mutatiom7 This is simply a simulation of the algorithm 
incorporating adaptive mutation where the learning rate, y, takes the value of 0. For all individuals, 
the mutation rate is initialized a t  a value of 0.025. As the learning rate is null, in these baseline 
simulations the mutation rate does not deviate from this value. 
In addition to the binary encoding process utilized in the original work considered above, we also 
incorporate a framework utilizing an encoding process in which adjacent integers differ by only a 
single bit (the hamming distance between adjacent integers equals one). We refer to  the two en- 
coding processes as Binary-Coded and Gray-Coded integers, respectively. Gray codes are a group of 
alternative encoding methods in which this adjacency property holds. Their use in the implementa- 
tion of genetic algorithms has been shown to improve the performance over implementation utilizing 
binary encoding. This performance improvement is grounded on the increased potential for small 
perturbations through successive single mutations of the encoded string.8 
Every simulation is run for a duration of 10,000 periods and contains 100 individual rules ( i r )  
'Arifovic (1994) also considers an application of indiv idual  learning (refer to  section 2.3.2) .  While feasible through 
adjustmenl of the fitness criterion, adaptive mutalion has not yet been investigated in models of i nd i v idua l  learning. 
Additionally, interpreting the algorithm as a reduced form description of human adaptation is more problematic due 
to  the variation of mutation rates within an individual's set of potential rules. We leave this analysis for future work. 
8 ~ e e  Hollstein (1971) for a consideration of genetic algorithm performance utilizing Gray-coded integers in a pure 
mathematical optimization problem. 
CHAPTER 4.  T H E  MUTH MODEL 94 
with 30 bits per encoded rule (k) .  They share identical demand and cost parameters fundamental to 
the rational expectations outcome for market price and individual quantity. These include the cost 
parameters, x and y, which are set at 0.00 and 0.016, respectively. Parameters specific to market 
demand, A and B, take the values of 2.296 and 0.0168, respectively. According to the equation 
determining the rational expectations outcome for market price presented in the preceding section, 
the perfectly competitive market price, P*, is equal to 1.12. 
Summary statistics for the time series of price for the baseline Arifovic (1994) algorithm are 
contained within Table 4.1. Simulations occur with a probability of crossover (p,) equal to zero 
("Without Crossover") and equal to 0.60 ("With Crossover"). For each parameterization of the 
probability of crossover, we utilize the algorithm incorporating the election operator, and the algo- 
rithm without its presence. For each simulation, the average price (P* )  and standard deviation of 
price (6) are reported. We also calculate the standard deviation of price over sub-periods of the 
entire simulation equal to 25. The average of these sub-period standard deviations (z) is reported 
for each s i m ~ l a t i o n . ~  
Price Statistics 
Without Crossover With Crossover 
No Election Election No Election Election 
Binary-Coded Integers 
Gray-Coded Integers 
Table 4.1: GA simulations of the Cobweb model - Arifovic (1994) 
The results presented in Table 4.1 are consistent with those reported in the original Arifovic 
(1994) work. Although true convergence does not occur in the simulations not utilizing the election 
operator, the average price over each simulation is within one standard deviation of the rational 
expectations outcome. For each simulation without the election operator, the standard deviation 
of price over the 25 period sub-samples is only slightly smaller than that calculated over the entire 
' ~ n  order to  ensure that the results are robust to different sequences of random numbers, all simulations are 
conducted over multiple runs using different initializing seed values for the random number generator. The set of 
initializing seeds for the random number generating process is identical between simulation frameworks. 
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simulation. Plots of the time series of price for the simulations are contained within Figure 4.1 and 
4.2. As the strength of the similarity between the simulation with and without the crossover operator 
precludes yielding any additional insight, we do not present the analogous plot for the simulation 
that  does not incorporate the crossover operator. 
Historical Price 
t5 i 
Figure 4.1: Market Price (With Crossover) - Arifovic (1994) 
The use of Gray-coded integers improves the performance of the simulations only marginally. 
Average price statistics are slightly closer to their rational expectations level. However, the standard 
deviation of prices does not differ from their binary-coded counterparts in any significant or consistent 
manner. While Gray encoded strings may increase the performance of genetic algorithtns in some 
contexts, they do not appear to do so in the framework considered within this work. We proceed 
using binary-coded integers in the remainder of this work. 
4.5.2 Adaptive Mutation - Baseline Fitness F'unct ion 
Against these baseline simulations of Arifovic (1994), we consider the results for the algorithm 
incorporating adaptive mutation in Table 4.2 and 4.3. 
The dynamics of the simulation are investigated over various permutations of the parameters 
specific to  the evolution of individuals' mutation rates. These will include the rate of learning, y, 
and the minimum allowable value for the individual mutation rate, p,. This minimum allowable 
- 
value functions as a strict lower bound; any alteration of the individuals' mutation rate that leaves 
it below this threshold is not allowed. Mutation rates that fall below this threshold are reset a t  the 
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Figure 4.2: Market Price (With Crossover) - Election Operator - Arifovic (1994). 
spccific value of this lowcr bound. This lower bound is motivated towards rnairltairiing a ~nirlirnurri 
level of heterogeneity and innovation within the simulation. 
In total, there are thirty-five permutations of these two parameters. We allow the learning rate, 
y ,  to take five different values; 
The lower bound on individual mutation rates takes seven different values, 
p,, E [O.OO, 0.003~,0.0066,0.010,0.015,0.020,0.025] 
- 
Over the permutations of the learning rate (7) and the lower bound on mutation (p,), we 
-
simulate algorithms including the crossover operator ( p ,  = 0.6) and without (p, = 0.0). Price 
summary statistics and summary statistics for the distribution of average mutation rates for the 
simulation without incorporating the crossover operator are contained in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, 
respectively. These statistics for the simulations including the crossover operator are included in 
Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 of the Appendix. 
The summary statistics for the distribution of average mutation rates include the sample mean 
(g), standard deviation (6,:), and skewness ("i,:). Each of these summary statistics is based on the 
per-period average mutation rate across all individual rules. 
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Price Statistics 
Lower bound on mutation rates 
Y 0.00 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 
Table 4.2: GA simulations of the Cobweb model - Adaptive Mutation - Baseline Fitness Function - 
Price Statistics 
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Distribution Statistics - pi. (Mutation Rate) 
Lower bound on mutation rates 
-J 0.00 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 
Table 4.3: GA simulations of the Cobweb model - Adaptive Mutation - Baseline Fitness Function - 
Distribution Statistics - p: (Mutation Rate) 
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For comparison with baseline simulation results in Figure 4.1, plots of the time series of price 
and average mutation rates are included in Figures 4.3 through 4.7. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 contain simulation output in which (y,p,) - is set equal to (0.05,0.033) and 
the likelihood of crossover, p,, equals 0.0 and 0.60, respectively. Figures 4.5 through 4.7 present 
sinlulations without crossover for the following (y, p,) - pairs - (0.05,0.00), (0.15,0.0), and (0.25,O.O). 
Plots of the average mutation rate are accompanied by the time series of their distributions' minimum 
and maximum values. 
Hisloncal Price 
0.9 I 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 
Hisloncal Average Mttation Rate 
0.1 
0.08 1 li 
Figure 4.3: Market Price (Without Crossover) - Learning Rate (y) 0.05, Lower bound on Mutation 
(p,) 0.033. 
Interestingly, in the majority of simulations, calculated over the simulations' entire duration the 
average price is above the rational expectations outcome. However, these mean prices are all within 
a single standard deviation of this equilibrium outcome. That is, the majority of simulations have 
inearl prices that are above the competitive equilibrium outcolr~e, though not 
Importantly, this is an expected result. Consider the rational expectations outcome for individual 
quantity and price, 0.70 and 1.12, respectively. Assume that all rules are currently consistent with 
this rational expectations outcome for individual quantity and that over this population mutation 
occurs. Furthermore, assume that for each mutation that increases an individual quantity by x 
percent, there is an associated mutation over a rule that decreases it by this same x percent. As such, 
the distribution of rules following mutation is centered around the rational expectations outcome 
and is symmetric. Average individual output is unchanged, and the price in the following period will 
1•‹Notably, we find that the Arifovic (1994) framework suffers from the same consistent positive discrepancy in 
average prices over the duration of the simulation (refer to  Table 4.1). 
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Historical Price 
Hlslorical Average Mutation Rate 
0.1 r 
Figure 4.4: Market Price (With Crossover) - Learning Rate (7) 0.05, Lower bound on Mutation (pm) 
0.003. 
Historical Price 
HIStoricaI Average Mutatlon Rate 
r 
Figure 4.5: Market Price (Without Crossover) - Learning Rate (7) 0.05, Lower bound on Mutation 
( ~ m )  0.0. 
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Hlstoncal Price 
Hlstoncal Average Muiatlon Rate 
0 2 r  
Figure 4.6: Market Price (Without Crossover) - Learning Rate (y) 0.15, Lower bound on Mutation 
( p m )  0.0. 
Hlstoncal Price 
H~slorical Average Mbtallon Rate 
Figure 4.7: Market Price (Without Crossover) - Learning Rate (y) 0.25, Lower bound on Mutation 
( P T ~ L )  0.0. 
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remain a t  its rational expectations value. 
All rules that are associated with a quantity that is not equal to the rational expectations level 
are associated with lower levels of profit, and therefore lower levels of fitness. However, those rules 
that deviated below the rational expectations level of output will be associated with a higher fitness 
than those that deviated above this level by an equal percent. This stems from the specification of 
the cost function. It's second derivative is positive, implying the changes in profit levels from equal 
z percent changes in output will not equal (holding the price constant a t  its rational expectations 
level). Rules associated with the rational expectations outcome are the most likely to be selected 
during the subsequent replication process. However, deviations below this level are more likely to be 
selected than their associated increase, as their fitness values are superior. As such, in the following 
period, replication results in a distribution of rules skewed towards lower values of production. 
This, in turn, favors positive deviations in price from its rational expectations outcome. Eventually, 
assuming no further mutations occur, the continuing favor for rules associated with output levels 
close to the rational expectations solution in the replication process eliminates all mutated rules from 
the population, returning it to the rational expectations level. However, this re-convergence occurs 
only after a positive deviation in the price. 
Discussion 
With respect to the comparison between the baseline and self adaptive simulations, four important 
regularities warrant discussion. 
0 Result (1) - For certain pararneterizations of the self adaptation mechanism, (y,p,), - sample 
distribution statistics pertaining to market price are indistinguishable between simulations 
utilizing fixed and self adaptive mutation. Statistical convergence is unaffected by the adoption 
of endogenous mutation rates. 
That is, for intermediate values of the parameters of the self adaptation mechanism, the mean 
and standard deviation of price over the full duration of the simulation are indistinguishable from 
those of the baseline Arifovic (1994) simulations. If one is only concerned with statistical convergence 
over the entire duration of simulations spanning many generations, including the complexity of self 
adaptation may not be parsimonious. This important regularity, however, holds only over the entire 
simulation sample. Contrarily, over smaller sub-samples of the simulations, these self adaptation 
distribution statistics look quite different from those of the baseline simulations. 
0 Result (2) - Adaptive mutation lowers small duration deviation measures from their population 
equivalent and from those of the baseline simulations. 
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Sub-sample deviation measures do decrease from their population counterparts in the baseline 
simulations. However, this decrease is of the magnitude of only 13.3 and 12.8 percent in the sim- 
ulations with and without crossover, respectively. These magnitudes are far smaller from those of 
simulations with self adaptation, even in those utilizing intermediate values for the (y,p,) - parame- 
ters. For example, consider in Table 2 those simulations in which the rate of learning, y, takes the 
value of 0.10. When the lower bound on mutation, p,, - is set a t  0.025 the difference between the 
full sample standard deviation, 6, and the sub-sample standard deviation, 6, is roughly 9.5 percent. 
Despite the fact that p,, - is set equal to  the rate of mutation in the simulation of the baseline Arifovic 
framework, the difference between full and sub-sample standard deviation measures is slightly lower. 
This stems from the fact that p, acts as a lower bound on mutation rates and that the average 
- 
rate of mutation over the course of a simulation will always be larger than this value. As the lower 
bound on mutation falls, so to will the average rate of mutation (see Table 4.3). In simulations in 
which the average rate of mutation is lower, the difference between the full and sub-sample standard 
deviation of price will increase. As evidence, consider the simulation for which the rate of learning, 
y, is set equal to 0.10 and the lower bound on mutation, p,, is allowed to be 0.00. Here the difference 
- 
between full and sub-sample standard deviation of price is approximately 78 percent. 
The substantial decrease in the sub-sample deviation measures from their population counterparts 
is indicative of an important serial autocorrelation inherent within the time series for price that is 
not a factor in the baseline simulations. 
0 Result (3) - When comparing baseline versus simulations incorporating self adaptation, the 
short duration dynamics of price look substantially different. Autocorrelation relationships in 
price become important for determining the intra-period dynamics of price. 
This is clearly a pheliolnelioli in the figures preseiitcd above. In the baselinc simulation, deviations 
from the rational expectations outcome appear to have no constructive relationship with each other. 
That is, these deviations appear to be simply white-noise. This is not the case for deviations 
associated with simulations incorporating self adaptation. In these simulations, negative deviations 
from the rational expectations outcome are very likely to be followed be a subsequent negative 
deviation, indicative of a increasingly significant autoregressive relationship. For research concerning 
short run dynamics, self adaptation may no longer be excluded on the basis of parsimony. 
A very important point is worth noting. Adaptive mutation is not necessary for the relationship 
described above in results (2) and (3); nor is it sufficient. These results are derived from the fact 
that average mutation rates are allowed to fall to an extremely low level. Any application of genetic 
algorithms in which mutation rates are quite low will be characterized in the same manner as we 
have described above. This stems from the fact that for mutation rates below llkrr, less than a single 
mutation is expected in every period across the entire population of rules. For periods in which no 
m~ltation occurs, thoso rules played in the preceding period are no difforent from those played in the 
current. The outcomes between these two periods do not differ; contributing to a autocorrelation 
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in results. The results are dependent on the very low mutation rates that result from the adaptive 
mutation mechanism, and not the mechanism itself.'' 
R.esult (4) - The progression towards a significant autocorrelation relationship in outcomes 
inherent with adaptive mutation may be at the expense of lower convergence reliability. 
If true convergence is to be attained in simulations involving genetic algorithm models without 
utilizing the election operator, mutation rates must fall to  levels approaching zero. That is, the 
lower bound on mutation rates, p,, - must be equal to zero. As stressed in the preceding paragraphs, 
this will lead to significant autocorrelation in the time series of simulated outcomes. The timing 
in which this autoregressive relationship is attained has important implications for the convergence 
reliability of simulations incorporating adaptive mutation. This timing is critically related to the 
rate of learning, y. As evidence of this claim, consider Figures 4.5 through 4.7 in which the lower 
bound on mutation, p,, is equal to zero and the rate of learning varies between the values 0.05, 0.15, 
- 
and 0.25. 
High values of y cause high speeds of adaptation with respect to the individual rate of mutation. 
When the lower bound on mutation rates is too low, this large rate of learning causes a very high, and 
possibly premature adaptation of very low ~rlutation ratcs. This premature adoption has the effect of 
removing the introduction of diversity into the population prior to the widespread adoption of a rule 
consistent with rational expectations. As such, the convergence reliability of the simulations is quite 
low. That is, the reliability of the rational expectations outcome in these simulations is somewhat 
low when compared to those simulations with lower learning rates and/or larger lower bounds on 
the rate of mutation. Though the reliability with respect to the rational expectations outcome is 
somewhat low, the velocity with which these simulations approach a non-rational outcome is very 
high. In comparison, the relative success of simulations with lower learning rates is likely driven 
by the fact that decreases in the mutation rate are much slower, therein avoiding simulative traps 
characterized by very low rates of mutation and non-rational price levels. Mutation rates in such 
simulations stay sufficiently high for a long enough progression of generations so as to allow rules to 
adopt a rational expectations strategy. 
Importantly, such traps never theoretically dismiss the possibility of convergence. As mutation 
rates may never take a value of zero, there will always be some innovation introduced into the 
environment, though this innovation may not occur in every period.'2 All that is required for 
convergence to eventually occur is for an innovation to be introduced that has a high enough relative 
fitness so as to begin the process of replication. The low mutation, non-rational situation is referred 
"The sufficiency of adaptive learning for results (2)  and (3) will be examined alongside f i tness dependent mutation 
modijicators considered later in this work. 
" ~ o t e  that  a deterministic mutation rate of l l k  = 0.033 leads to  an  expected mutation of one binary bit per 
individual in every period. A deterministic mutation rate of l / ( k n )  = 0.00033 leads to  an expected mutation of one 
binary bit over the entire population, therein guaranteeing the expectation of a t  least one innovation in every period. 
Any deterministic mutation rate lower than l / ( k n )  will introduce innovation, though not, in expectation, every period. 
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to as a trap only to emphasize that simulations will escape this trap, though it will occur with very 
low probability in every period. 
In brief, autocorrelated outcomes associated with very low rates of mutation are required for 
convergence to the rational expectations outcome. As such, the lower bound on mutation must be 
set at or very near zero. However, if you approach these low mutation rates too quickly, you are 
likely converging to a non-rational outcome. Even for the lowest parameterization of the rate of 
learning, the reliability of the outcome with respect to the rational expectations equilibrium is far 
from anything warranting implementation of adaptive mutation. 
4.5.3 Adaptive Mutation - Extended Fitness Function 
The importance of selective pressure has already been discussed in Section 4.1. Back and Schutz 
have claimed that for the self adaptation mechanism to work effectively at least one bit per binary 
string must be mutated on average. Of course, as discussed above, this would preclude convergence 
without an election operator. However, the purpose of their lower bound on mutation is to guaran- 
tee enough diversity to ensure significant selective advantage. This need not be the only manner to 
attain selective pressure. Schwefel (1987, 1992) demonstrated that strong selective pressure is nec- 
essary for the self adaptation principle to work. He proposed ( p ,  A)-selection to attain such selective 
pressure, though Back and Schutz have shown only a smaller convergence velocity is associated with 
proportional selection, not a lack of convergence. In any case, as demonstrated in the preceding 
section, as the lower bound on mutation is allowed to fall below the levels proposed by Back and 
Schutz the necessity for significant selective pressure increases beyond that which may be supplied 
by thc bascline fitness calculation considcrcd in previous literature. 
There is the possibility that low-mutation pitfalls may be avoided if one strengthens the selective 
pressure within the algorithm. This stronger selective pressure may preclude the premature adoption 
of very low levels of mutation. With a stronger selection pressure, rules adopting a critically low 
level of mutation before reaching the rational expectations outcome will have a lower likelihood of 
replication. Their propagation is less likely when selection is more strict, as other rules with only 
slightly higher fitness values have a higher likelihood of replication. 
In order to  assess this conjecture, we simulate the same parameterizations of the framework 
considered above. However, instead of the baseline fitness function we adopt the transformed effective 
fitness functiori of equation (8). Table 4.4 arid 4.5 contain pricc arid mutation rate sa~nplc statistics for 
the effective fitness simulations without the crossover operator. These tables are directly comparable 
to Table 4.2 arid 4.3 in which the baseline fitness furictiori was utilized. The appendix contains Tables 
4.10 and 4.11 in which the effective fitness framework is simulated with the crossover operator. These 
tables are directly comparable to Tables 4.8 and 4.9 of the appendix. 
Time series data for select simulations are contained in Figures 4.8 and 4.9. In each of these 
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Price Statistics 
Lower bound on mutation rates 
Y 0.00 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 
Table 4.4: GA simulations of the Cobweb model - Adaptive Mutation - Extended Fitness Function 
- Price Statistics 
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Distribution Statistics - pi (Mutation Rate) 
Lower bound on mutation rates 
Y 0.00 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 
Table 4.5: GA simulations of the Cobweb model - Adaptive Mutation - Extended Fitness Function 
- Distribution Statistics - pi (Mutation Rate) 
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figures, the lower bound on mutation, p,,, is zero. The rate of learning, y, is 0.15 in Figure 4.8 and 
-
0.25 in Figure 4.9. Thcsc two figures have baselinc fitness cou~iterparts presented in Figures 4.6 and 
4.7, respectively. 
Hidotical Pnce 
I 
Historical Average Mutation Rate 
0.2r 
Figure 4.8: Market Price (Without Crossover) - Learning Rate (7) 0.15, Lower bound on Mutation 
(p,) 0.0, Effective Fitness Transformation. 
Discussion 
Comparing Tables 4.4 and 4.5 with their baseline fitness function counterparts, Tables 4.2 and 4.3, 
provides insight into the importance of having very strict selective pressure, especially when one 
considers simulations in which the lower bound on mutation is allowed to be zero. 
0 Result (5) - In algorithms utilizing adaptive mutation with a lower bound below that proposed 
by Back and Schiitz, a high degree of selective pressure is required in order to avoid low- 
mutation non-convergence traps. 
This result becomes even more apparent when one compares Figures 4.7 and 4.8 with their 
bascline fitness function counterparts. Situations in which mutation rates fall to a critically low 
level preceding convergence to the rational expectations outcome are much less likely to occur under 
the effectivr fitness transformation. While these traps bccome far less likely, they are still not an 
impossibility. However, the convergence reliability of the adaptive mutation algorithm with the 
effective fit,ncss transformation represents a significant improvement. over the constant mutation 
algorithm baseline. Simulations with lower bounds of mutation set at zero are characterized by long 
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Historical Price 
Historical Average Muiation Rate 
0.4 r 
Figure 4.9: Market Price (Without Crossover) - Learning Rate (7) 0.25, Lower bound on Mutation 
(p,) 0.0, Effective Fitness Transforma.tion. 
stretches of convergent behavior with periodic deviations. These deviations are relatively short lived, 
with behavior converging with the rational expectations outcome afterwards. 
The constant introduction of diversity proposed by Back and Schiitz is not a necessity if one can 
introduce selective pressure in other ways. Here, the transformation of raw profits into the effective 
fitness function is sufficient for providing such pressure. 
4.5.4 Adaptive Mutation - Fitness dependent mutation modificators ( p  > 
0 > 
While the effective fitness transformation is sufficient in the environment considered within this 
work, it may not necessarily be sufficient in all simulation contexts. However, imposing a limitation 
on mutation rates may not be reql~ircd if one is willing to  incorporate a fitness depcndent mutation 
modificator penalty. Such penalties may replace the need for a lower bound by limiting the reduction 
in mutat.ion rates only to those that increase raw fitness values above the cost associated with their 
adoption. 
As it has been shown that there is no empirical distinction between simulations with, and without 
the crossover operator, the introduction of fitness dependent mutation modificators will be limited 
to  simulations with a likelihood of crossover (p,) equal to  zero. The lower bound on mutation 
rates (p,) is held at  0. For each simulation, the global mutation rate (m) and the mutation rate 
- 
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modificator factor ( q )  are set equal to 2 and 0.033, respectively.13 Various permutations of the 
remaining underlying simulation parameters are considered. The rrlutatioll rate modificator penalty 
(p) is drawn from the following set. 
The parameter governing the rate of learning, y,  is drawn from the same set as within the above 
analysis. 
As such, there are thirty permutations of these two parameters. Results for each parameterization 
are contained in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. Varying the mutation rate modificator penalty ( p ) ,  these 
tables are directly comparable to t,he first column of Table 4.2 and 4.3 where the value of p is implicitly 
equal to  zero.14 Plots associated with two specific parameterizations are contained in Figure 4.10 
a.nd 4.11. Figure 4.11 is directly comparable to  Figure 4.9 in which the mut,at,ion modificator penaky 
is implicitly zero. 
Historical Pnce 
Historical Average Mutation Rate 
Figure 4.10: Market Price (Without Crossover) - Learning Rate (y) 0.05, Lower bound on Mutation 
(p, ,)  0.0, Fitness Penalty (p) 0.0001. 
13nefer to  equation (4.9) and (4.12). 
l 4 ~ y  way of illustration, compare the two equations determining relative fitricss in the fitness independent and 
dependent settings; equation (4.8) and equation (4.12), respectively 
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Price Statistics 
Mutation Rate Modificator Penalty ( p )  
Y 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 
Table 4.6: GA simulations of the Cobweb model - Adaptive Mutation - Mutation Modificator Penalty 
- Price Statistics 
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Distribution Statistics - pi (Mutation Rate) 
Mutation Rate Modificator Penalty ( p )  
?' 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 
Table 4.7: GA simulations of the Cobweb model - Adaptive Mutation - Mutation Modificator Penalty 
- Distribution Statistics - pi (Mutation Rate) 
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Historical Price 
H~slorical Average Mufation Rate 
0.4 r 
Figure 4.11: Market Price (Without Crossover) - Learning Rate (y) 0.25, Lower bound on Mutation 
(p,) 0.0, Fitness Penalty (p) 0.0001. 
Discussion 
The addition of fitness penalties has i~nportant impacts on the resulting dynamics of the simulations. 
Although true convergence is not associated with any of the parameterizations, a notable result 
warrants discussion. 
Result (6) - Maintaining diversity without invoking a lower bound on mutation rates is possible 
through the introduction of even very small fitness dependent mutation modificator penalties. 
As already noted, low mutation rates are attained through very high levels for the parameter 
of learning (7) in conjunction with a level for the lower bound of mutation (P,~,,) - set at zero. The 
introduction of the fitriess penalty assures rules with mutation rates below the level associated with 
long run fitness improvements greater in absolute value than their respective fitness penalty are not 
proliferated. The higher the mutation rate modificator penalty (p), the larger must be any fitness 
improvements associated with mutation rate deviations for their proliferation among the population. 
As evidence of this fact, in Table 4.7, for high levels of the rate of learning, y ,  as the mutation rate 
modificator penalty increases (p), so to does the average rate of mutation across all individuals, d. 
For sufficiently punitive levels of p, average rates of mutation approach the parameterization of m, 
the global mutation rate.15 
151Xefer to  equation (4.9) and (4.12). 
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Therefore, even in simulative environments in which an effective fitness transformation is insuf- 
ficient to avoid rlorl-convergent low-mutation rate traps, imposing a lower bound on mutation is not 
necessary for maintaining diversity. Utilizing a modificator penalty guarantees a level of diversity 
that balances the potential fitness benefits of lower mutation rates against their cost. Invoking a 
lower bound on mutation rates is equivalent to placing a very punitive fitness penalty on mutation 
adaptation. While this special case is sufficient for irlairitainiilg a predetermined level of diversity, 
it is not necessary. Even for the very smallest fitness penalty, mutation rates are unlikely to fall 
to levels associated with low mutation rate traps, regardless of the simulative context. While these 
fitness penalties are not required in all environments, in those where an insufficient level of selective 
pressure presents a problem for convergence, introducing such penalties may serve to  replace the 
parameterization of a lower bound on mutation. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Limiting its focus to the mutation operator, this work acknowledges the importance of the introduc- 
tion of innovation, but maintains the level with which innovation is introduced should be determined 
within the framework of the model rather than being exogenously imposed or limited through the 
use of an election operator. The mechanism proposed for determining the rate a t  which innovation 
is introduced is based on the idea of on-line learning, or self-adaptation. 
The performance of simple genetic algorithms to  ones in which the election operator is included 
and those characterized by self-adaptation in an economic setting is compared. The cobweb envi- 
ronment examined by Arifovic (1994) is utilized for the analysis. 
It  is demonstrated that for self-adaptation to  yield results consistent with convergence to the 
rational expectations equilibrium, a high degree of selective pressure is required. In the framework 
considered, a simple fitness transformation is sufficient for providing this required selective pressure. 
In simulations utilizing this fitness transformation, those with lower bounds of mutation set at 
zero are characterized by long stretches of convergent behavior with periodic deviations. These 
deviations are relatively short lived, with behavior converging with the rational expectations outcome 
afterwards. 
Though this fitness transformation is sufficient in the context of this work, it is argued that in 
environments for which it is insufficient, utilizing a lower bound on mutation above zero may not be 
required if the model incorporates f i tness dependent m u t a t i o n  modificators.  Utilizing a modzficator 
penalty guarantees a level of diversity that balances the potential fitness benefits of lower mutation 
rates against their cost. Even for the very smallest fitness penalty, mutation rates are unlikely to  
fall to  levels associated with low mutation rate traps, regardless of the simulative context. 
In an economic system of constant change, there is likely a requirement for constant introduction 
of innovation. It  is likely, however, that there is an optimal rate a t  which this innovation occurs 
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and that it is dependent on the underlying stochastic nature of the system in question. This work 
lends itself to  extensions in which the economic environment is characterized by constant change; 
it's consideration is left for future work. 
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4.7 Appendix 
Price Statist 
Lower bound on mutation rates 
Y 0.00 0.003 0.00G 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 
Table 4.8: GA simulations of the Cobweb model (with genetic crossover) - Adaptive Mutation - 
Baseline Fitness Function - Price Statistics 
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Distribution Statistics - p: (Mutation Rate) 
Lower bound on mutation rates 
Y 0.00 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 
Table 4.9: GA simulations of the Cobweb model (with genetic crossover) - Adaptive Mutation - 
Baseline Fitness Function - Distribution Statistics - p: (Mutation Rate) 
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Price Statistics 
Lower bound on mutation rates 
Y 0.00 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 
Table 4.10: GA simulations of the Cobweb model (with genetic crossover) - Adaptive Mutation - 
Extended Fitness Function - Price Statistics 
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Distribution Statistics - VI (Mutation Rate) 
Lower bound on mutation rates 
Y 0.00 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 
Table 4.11: GA simulations of the Cobweb model (with genetic crossover) - Adaptive Mutation - 
Extended Fitness Function - Distribution Statistics - pi (Mutation Rate) 
